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Wittgenstein’s Language Game and Musical Language  
(of The Second Viennese School) – Meaning and Understanding  

Abstract: The three fundamental and closely-related concepts from Wittgenstein’s late work Philosophical Investigation – the concept of language game, of meaning and of understanding – are examined in this study in the context of the problematization of music as a musical language and a musical language/piece of music (used in the traditional European sense) as a musical-language game, as well as the questions of its meaning and understanding. In connection with this, the period of radical changes in the traditional tonal musical language in the compositions of The Second Viennese School turned out to be peculiarly provocative, hence, on this occasion, we are attempting to point out the specificities of the changes of a (musical) language built and upgraded through the centuries.  

Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, language game, meaning, understanding, musical language, musical-language game, The Second Viennese School  

Firstly, it is important to emphasize that the concepts of language game, of meaning and of understanding are set out in the Philosophical Investigation in the function of a philosophical requirement for a change of the traditional practice of treating philosophy as a “revelation” in the religious sense or “discoveries” in the scientific sense,¹ that is, in the function of “critical and analytical philosophy of philosophy”². It is not therefore the question of Wittgenstein’s dealing with problems of music  

here. Although it contains musical references, *Philosophical Investigation* is not the realization of philosophy of music, as it is interpreted by some authors. It is a work of analytical philosophy, respectively philosophy of ordinary language which, however, appeared as important in the approach to music in a methodological sense. Thus, a possible meaning and possible application of Wittgenstein’s mentioned philosophic concepts beyond philosophy are discussed here, in the field of an interest sphere and competences of a musicologist.

Given Wittgenstein’s broad setting, we have interpreted the concept of language game as an open concept, and consequently, differentiated its possible meaning in both narrow and broad senses. The concept of language game in a narrow sense means the *use* of words/language according to or opposite to the language rules. The assumption of language game is knowing the rules applied and carried out analogous to the rules of the social game. This actually points to language and games as the production systems of sense, meaning, and value in the world, i.e., in the society and culture.

Thus the understood concept of language game means that from “life or ‘behavioral’ activities carried out in the language there appear the effects within that language” – *meaning*, “which as such we understand in the function of words’ use [pragmatics] and reference relations of words and concepts [syntax]”, rather than in the function of their transcendental connections with elements of the conceptual, phenomenal world. Hence, language games, as well as social games, and the meanings these assume, are based on *understanding*. By explaining the concept of understanding, it is no coincidence that Wittgenstein compared understanding a sentence with understanding a musical theme thus referring to his concept of understanding as understanding the *sense* – the syntactic order of the language, and meaning. Wittgenstein, it should be pointed out, seems to have neglected the subtle differences between the concepts of sense and of meaning, when he stresses that the sentence should be considered as an instrument, and its sense as its employment. However, from the

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5 In that sense Wittgenstein is very precise: “I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.” and “[…] we talk about it [language – M. L] as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties. The question ‘What is a word really?’ is analogous to ‘What is a piece in chess?’” Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 31, §66; 47, §108.


7 Italic is added by M. L.

8 Miško Šuvaković, “Ludvig Vitgenštajn i analitička estetika”, op. cit., 129.


11 Ibid, 126, §421.
above-mentioned comparison it follows that he differentiates shades of meaning of these concepts. Nevertheless, these differences for him, it would seem, are not decisive, because both concepts refer to the use of words. And given that the meaning is, in principle, the same thing as the language game – the use of words/language based on linguistic rules – understanding a sentence or a language means understanding that use, or, better, *technique or techniques of that use* (“To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to master a technique.”12). Furthermore, the very use of a language reveals one’s understanding, i.e., level of understanding of that language. And the way we understand a language is habit, custom, institution.13

Thus, the use of words/language according to or opposite to the language rules – and that, therefore, also means certain interpretation of meaning – is based upon public rules of that language, i.e., contracts, customs, habits which presume learning, understanding, knowledge, certain mastery of technique/techniques of use of that language and its rules. In other words, to play a language game – to “calculate” or do something with words/language according to or opposite to the rules of that game – does not mean just to know the rules for the use of the language, but also the very use of language, precisely, *technique or techniques of use* of the both language and its rules, incarnated in situations, contexts, practices, cultures, and histories of language use – in the language *forms of life*.14 Namely, according to Wittgenstein, “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life”.15 In that sense, he explained that “[c]ommanding, questioning, recounting, chatting are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.”16 Wittgenstein, also, added numerous life circumstances in terms of the multiplicity of language games (for example, “giving orders and obeying them”, “forming and testing a hypothesis”, “singing catches”, “making a joke [and] telling it”)17, i.e. different language forms which depend on different cultures and different historical periods.

Therefore, there are numerous kinds of language games and “this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all, but new types of language, new language-games […] come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. […] And […] there [is] also the case where we play and – make up the rules as we go along […] And there is even one where we alter them – as we go along.”18

There is, therefore, the language as the *complex system of interpersonal relationships*, consequently, a dynamic category, something that is changing and/or changes

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12 Ibid, 81, §199.
13 Ibidem.
14 “I shall […] call the […] language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game’. […] And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.” Ibid, 5, §7; 8, §19.
16 Ibid, 128, §25.
us; the language as the field of acting, articulation of thinking and speech which thus becomes conceptual; the language as possibility of thinking and possibility of speech, as the dimension of human existence, as the special space-time which, hence, does not affect people simply; but, as it is well noted by Judith Genova, with its syntax and semantics, and also to add grammar, it orients us in the world, directs our existential discrimination in the world. This is for the reason that every human interaction with the world is already a mediation through sign, i.e., language. In this way a certain use of language means a “conceptual landscape” which, in turn, means an existential one; for the same reason, a language, i.e., a language game, in a broad meaning of the term, means a form of life. “We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. [We are talking about] the natural history of human beings.”

The problem that arises at this point is the issue of the relationship between music and language. The main question is the following one: what is it that “allows” the analogy between language and music?

The answer to this question directs us to the same place on the basis of which Wittgenstein established an analogy between language and social games. Since music, too, depends on knowing and understanding the rules carried out and applied analogous to the rules of language, and social games as well. We are talking about music, of course, by way of the analogy and the ability to read mutatis mutandis, namely, just like the system of rules at different levels: phonological – scale level (modes, major and minor scales, pentatonic, chromatic twelve-tone scale, series etc.); grammar – level of harmony, counterpoint, orchestration, standardized forms, i.e. the totality of musical-expressive means (musical components or their elements – elements of melody, rhythm, meter, harmony, dynamics, tempo, colour, orchestration, etc.) and the rules of techniques of their use; syntax – the level of structure of a musical form; semantic (formal-meaning level).

It is important to emphasize here that very specific musical syntax, in the specifically musical way, governs connections and interrelationships of elements of selected musical material in a particular form, and therefore, constitutes a certain musical semantics – it constitutes, as Berislav Popović says, “a formal meaning only within the [certain] piece” – therefore, only in the use! In other words, the musical syntax, as Popović further explains, does not constitute any previous meaning as in the case of syntax of language, which, as it is well-known, organizes previously-given

vocabulary, i. e., a system of signs that already have some meaning. The fact is that when comparing musical language and conceptual language it is not always possible to be at the same levels. At the syntactic level can be established precise comparisons (for example, musical motive is analogous to word in ordinary language, a musical phrase – an ordinary sentence), but the musical syntax and language syntax do not “operate”, hence, the same media means, therefore, not in the same way. Music constitutes compositional vocabulary post factum. The composer’s vocabulary is made of all those words, i. e. terms and concepts which denote all the ways in which elements of musical means of expression are organized, and this also means the way in which is organized the very elementary syntactic level – the motive level.

Therefore, it can be said, that music is a specific, non-conceptual i. e. musical language with its autonomous laws and logic of shaping, which also has its own dictionary (compositional vocabulary) and orthography (musical notation), through which this music language (as well as a piece of music/musical form) becomes “objective”, “visible”. And when Popović says that “[m]usical language and musical form can be neither learned nor used if there wasn’t norm”, he points to the fact that nonconceptualness, as well as the multilayer property of music is a point of encounter of the musical and ordinary languages, and that the described system of rules implies, hence, those levels to which the music itself allows to be conceptualized in our immediate understanding of its immanent relations. If such a conceptualization of music did not exist, we would never be able to either know or say something about it, nor would we be able to create it. Because, once again, every human interaction with the world, and that also applies to music, is already mediated through sign/language.

Therefore, if the language game, in its narrow sense, is the use of words/language in accordance with or opposite to the language rules, then, by analogy, the musical-language game, also in the narrow sense, is the use of the elements of the musical language or musical language in accordance with or opposite to its rules. For, without these rules, not only that the elements of musical language would not have a meaning, but musical language would, therefore, not be a language at all (as the conceptual language would not be a language without its rules). Further, similar to the meaning of the conceptual language, it can be said that the meaning of music, or even better, of a musical-expressive means (which consequently means a formal solution) is its use in language. This also means that from the “life” or “behavioral” activities carried out in the musical language there appear the effects with that language – meanings which, as such, we would not be able to understand otherwise than as a function of the use of musical-expressive means (pragmatics) and their reference relations (syntax). Certainly, musical language and musical-language game, just like a language game and social games, are based on understanding. And what we understand when we understand

25 Berislav Popović, op. cit., 353.
music is nothing else but the use, i.e. the way, technique of use of musical-expressive means/musical language based on its rules. For that reason, similar to Wittgenstein, we can say that to understand a musical sentence/musical theme means to understand one musical language. And understanding a musical language means mastering a certain technique. In other words, to understand a musical language means to understand its *sense* i.e. its form (the way of shaping) and meaning.

The term musical form is used in Popović’s sense of ordered shaping, organization of musical works, and musical flow, i.e. all musical components and their elements by which a musical flow is formed.26 And this is, ultimately, “a sound with all the features and relations on the basis of which they[?]only make sense in music”27. It is, therefore, the musical form as a specific “organization of sounds”, as a specific *form of thinking* – “thinking through the music”,28 whose meaningfulness therefore cannot be anywhere else than in the music itself, which means in use itself. But this very use indicates that meaning is not only musical but also extramusical and symbolic.29 It is therefore, in the very composer practice of playing, i.e. in the musical language game of composers, i.e. the very pieces of music.

Thence, it can be concluded that to play a musical language game – calculate or do something with elements of a musical language/musical language according to or opposite to its rules – is also a habit, a custom, an institution, i.e. a practice. That would actually mean that the acting according to or opposite to the musical-language rules also means a certain interpretation of meaning of the musical language and its rules, by which, in fact, that language is diversified. Thus, for example, there are so many different “readings” of the sonata form, so many “exceptions” to the rule of the “formal pattern”; so many different games/uses of what we call the sonata form. That is why, after all, the application of the rules is, in a way, its distortion – distortion in terms of upgrading, deepening and widening – development, innovation.30 And this surely presumes learning, understanding, knowledge, a certain mastery of technique/techniques of use of musical language and its rules, also incarnated in situations, contexts, practices, cultures, histories of musical-language use – in the musical language *forms of life*. Thus, playing one musical-language game, ultimately means “creatively coping” with an inherited musical language. And the very “coping”, again, is the matter of practice, i.e. public rules, “contracts” or “deals” within a cultural, historical musical milieu which has never been “isolated” from the general meaning of the context.

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26 Cf. ibid, 130.
27 Ibid, 359.
28 Cit. ibid, 357.
30 Cf. Tijana Popović-Mladjenović, “Differentia specifica (1)”, op. cit., 29. This, however, does not mean that any application of the rules is its distortion. Just as it is indicated, it refers only to the innovative procedures. And being that sonata form is mentioned, a paradigmatic example in this respect would be, say, symphonic poem of Franz Liszt.
Therefore, neither the musical language nor its rules are fixed and given once and for all, but they rather change along with the change of this context. The change of musical language rules results in the change of meaning of the language. But this change is also conditioned by the level of mastery of technique/techniques of use of language and its rules, and constant maturing of a certain way of uses of musical means of expression. The emergence of new musical language games is precisely the result of reaching a certain level of maturation of previous ways of a musical language use – the level at which these ways become unavoidable solutions and conventions. Consequently, the conventions are violated.

In this sense Mirjana Veselinović-Hofman explains that “every stylistic period of music was established on the basis of individual ‘reading’ [i.e. diversifying] of a stylistic musical (con)text preceding to this period”, which among other things means that it – either directly or indirectly – established a certain relation to it.

The most radical changes in the historical development of musical language occurred in the work of Schoenberg, Webern and Berg. The tonal musical language that was carefully created and upgraded for centuries, was changed with these composers at all its levels, from the phonological to semantic levels. The composer’s vocabulary had also changed, so the new concepts – atonality and non-thematism, and latter dodecaphony – figure within it. It is important, however, that the creating of a new, atonal language (from both the period ‘free atonality’ and the period of legalized atonality through dodecaphony) did not mean a discontinuity in the historical development of the musical language, but that it occurred in a purely evolutional way. This is best illustrated by the fact that the expressionism of Schoenberg and his disciples is realized in the direct “reading”, i.e. diversifying of the late romantic stylistic (con)text immediately preceding in their own (early) pieces of music. And more importantly, not only did the atonal language derive from tonal, but it was also formulated on the basis of the reviews and interpretations of the meaning of the traditional musical language, its rules and terms. The composers were searching for musical-language rules which in the functional sense would be analogous to the rules of tonal system/tonal language, hence the new rules were established on the basis of the old ones or in analogy to them.

One of the striking examples in this regard is the concept of Klangfarbenmelodie which Schoenberg theoretically formulated in Harmonielehre and practically applied for the first time in Fünf Orchesterstücke op. 16 (particularly in the 3rd Piece, “Farben”), which is also typical for Webern. But the way of understanding the concept of Klangfarbenmelodie is partly different for these composers, in accordance with the

31 Cf. Mirjana Veselinović-Hofman, Pred muzičkim delom, op. cit., 156.
33 Ibid, 12.
concept of musical idea (Gedanke), which is also central in both Schoenberg and Webern’s aesthetics, and in a particular realization it involves the ultimate autonomy of musical logic. The difference is that for Schoenberg it means elaboration of a material of a musical totality on the basis of cause-consequential relations, to achieve the fundamental formal requirements – the logic and coherence. Thus, the concept Klangfarbenmelodie carried out on the basis of interpretation of the meaning of the melody in the traditional sense implies for Schoenberg such a way of orchestral and harmonic thinking, which is governed by a rule analog to the rule that governs the traditional way of melodic thinking. Thus, in the 3rd piece, orchestral and harmonic components take the rule melodic and rhythmic components had had once, and also harmonic one in a constructive sense of segmentation of the musical flow through a cadencing process. Namely, the end of each segment in the 3rd piece is signaled by the chord from the beginning of the piece, but each time in a different variant of orchestral and harmonic colours, and also metro-rhythmical configuration, dynamics and articulation. This is also applied to the music form of the piece as a whole. Each section is a new ‘tune’ of orchestral, harmonic, and metro-rhythmic and dynamic combinations of the same chord.

In Webern’s work, however, the concept of Klangfarbenmelodie is realised on the basis of a kind of organic spinning/development of the whole piece of the work from the initial musical idea which the composer understands as a kind of “musical germ”, i.e. a musical motive, and which, therefore, “does not contain any logical musical relations that are not projected on the totality of the work”. Hence, Webern’s musical language game in general is characterized by an extreme economy of musical means of expression, by concentration only on what is essential, on avoidance of repetition – at both the level of pitch and of the whole work, i.e. form, and hence the principle of variation, variational spinning the shape from the initial “germ”, musical idea, musical motive. Hence the extremely miniaturized forms in Webern’s work. In this regard, representative is the 4th piece from Fünf Stücke für Orchester op. 10 shaped in only 6–7 bars by variational spinning of motive given at the beginning of the piece at the mandolin, from whose interval and rhythmic variants both the melodic and harmonic components of musical flow of the piece are constituted (this means shortening the motive, its metric displacement, syncopation, augmentation, widening, retrograde exposure, reversion, changes in size or direction of interval). In addition, a consistent segmentation and fragmentation of musical material in various instrumental sections, i.e. registers and colours, result in an entirely new grammar – pointillism (stacking sound ‘points’).

Concepts of atonality, athematism, Klangfarbenmelodie, as well as the concept of pointillism, do not represent, however, a system of grammatical rules which on a

35 Mirjana Veselinović-Hofman, Pred muzičkim delom, op. cit., 60.
36 Ibid, 61.
37 The 3rd piece contains the four segments: a (bar 1–11), b (b. 12–20), c (b. 20–30), a₁ (b. 31–44).
38 Mirjana Veselinović-Hofman, Pred muzičkim delom, op. cit., 90.
large scale of shaping establishes the entire system of relations in the organization of all parameters of musical language; a system which allows "effectiveness of those essential and permanent necessities, laws and rules"\(^{39}\) ‘constants’ of a music piece, deeply hidden, because of the circumstances, under the many-centuries establishment of conventions, customs, norms – expression and perspicuity, i. e. communication.\(^{40}\) It was therefore necessary – on the basis of newly established relationship in the very phonological basis (twelve tone chromatic scale) – to find to tonal system an analogous functional system of relations in the realization of coherence or sense in music. It is just that sense and aim that Schoenberg’s dodecaphony system of musical-language rules had, which regulates mutual relations of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ planes of musical flow through a specific organization of phonological bases – tone row. Not even as such, however, did the rules of dodecaphonic grammar conform to the basic principles of atonal language – avoiding any associations with the tonality and avoiding repetition (so characteristic of the tonal language). Precisely for this reason, and due to the above-mentioned, Schoenberg and Webern often played with traditional forms. Hence, there is often the sonata form in dodecaphonic works of these composers and among representative examples of this type are the first movements of Schoenberg’s *Woodwind Quintet* op. 26 and Webern’s *Symponie* op. 21. Unlike non-thematic compositions in which they rejected the concept of themes and avoided the traditional type of exposure of material, the dodecaphonic works of these composers did not exclude either. Moreover, Schoenberg and Webern actually redefined traditional concepts. In the concept of theme they *no longer think* tonally, but use serial shaping section (the theme is the tone row). Although they *understand* the concept of sonata form as *a game according to the grammatical rules* of that form (a formal scheme), it no longer means *acting according to the rules* of its tonal grammar, which constituted the essence of its dramaturgy (the contrast of different tonalities). The traditional principles of building the form conformed to the roles of dodecaphonic language (the contrasting of different shapes and transposition of tone row).

This creative ‘coping’ with inherited tonal language, and then simultaneously with the dodecaphonic language, is characteristic of Berg’s musical-language game in general. Berg finds, both in game with tonal and the game with dodecaphonic language, the potentials for a variety of meanings – both musical and extramusical. Thus, for example, in his entire opera *Wozzeck* – a typical piece of the period of free atonality, and the *Violinkonzert* written in the dodecaphonic language, the composer plays with the old instrumental forms (suite, military march, rondo, symphony, fugue with fantasy, inventions etc. in the opera) finding in them different musical and extramusical meanings, i. e., deeply hidden connections between musical logic and extramusical situations. In addition, in the opera, the composer plays with musical-expressive means according to the grammar of free atonality, but partially opposite to it, interfering in the game tonal ‘figure’, for example, C-major (a leitmotif of money/poverty),

\(^{39}\) Tijana Popović-Mladjenović, “Differentia specifica (1)”, op. cit., 29.

\(^{40}\) Ibidem.
which, however, due to changes of the rules acquires another meaning – in the atonal flow becomes dissonant; then, paradoxically, a dissonant chord by which each act of the opera ends gets, in that way, the meaning of ‘tonal center’. In a similar manner, Berg acted in Violinkonzert, with the difference that there is simultaneously the game according to and opposite to the rules of both the dodecaphonic language and what is its extreme opposite – tonal languages. One of the exemplary cases is the tone row and its use in shaping the first theme of the 1st movement: successive exposure of major and minor triads in the very tone row results with allusion to the G-minor, D-major, A-minor, E-major scales, which resembles the circle of fifths. The first theme is shaped from a main form of tone row in a way that creates a reference to the tonal center G-minor scale.

Therefore, in the use of the musical language, in the piece of music, said in Wittgenstein’s manner, it is demonstrated what otherwise would not be simultaneously said in the same use: one level and type of skills of mastery of musical language, mastery of technique of use of language and its rules, and it means one level and kind of musical-language understanding and knowledge. Although Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, by coincidence of historical circumstances on the Western European composers’ scene, were the main actors of the changes of the previously-used tonal musical language, the achieved level of musical language understanding and knowledge in their work means one new way of understanding European musical tradition. This is because, as it turned out, it is only on the basis of understanding of the previous composer experience and acquiring previous composer knowledge that a new musical language, i. e., a new meaningful music speech could originate. And it is not just because these composers belonged to the same European or, narrower, German, or, the narrowest, Viennese cultural-musical milieu, but also because, as it is well known, Webern and Berg were Schoenberg’s students and “if they […] reached closest to the aesthetic views and musical language of their teacher it was not only because of their artistic individualities, which were clearly resonated with Schoenberg’s, but, in addition, and on the ground of that, because of the authority of Schoenberg the teacher – his specific method of teaching, the system of conveying knowledge which neither invalidated the authority nor broke tradition.”

For all these reasons, we can finally conclude that the musical language, as it is in its own way the conceptual language, is a complex system of interpersonal relationships, a dynamic category, a field of acting, a dimension of human existence, a special space-time, a system which, also, not only affects people, but throughout its own specific music grammar, syntax and semantic, orients them in the world of music, i. e., directs their existential discrimination in the world. It is for this reason that the use of musical language is a conceptual landscape which, in turn, is an existential one; and for the same reason, a musical language/a musical-language game, in a broad meaning of the term, is a form of life.

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41 Mirjana Veselinović, Stvaralačka prisutnost evropske avangarde u nas, Beograd, Univerzitet umetnosti, 1983, 137.