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Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and the Perception of Reality from the Visual Field of the Other: Analysis of the Relation between Ordinary Language Philosophy and Poststructural Critique of Vision

Abstract: The first objective of this work is to establish a parallel between the ordinary language philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as the philosophy of Stanley Cavell and poststructuralism and its theories through their apprehension of vision and seeing as conceptual categories. The second objective is the analysis of perception of reality from the visual field of the other (children, women, other civilizations and peripheral parts of society) as a place of position of the subject in the frame of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic poststructural theory, Jacques Derrida's deconstructivism and psychoanalytic poststructural feminist theories (Irigaray, Kristeva).

Keywords: The other, gaze, poststructuralism, non-Euclidean geometries, mirror stage, language

This study seeks to establish a parallel between ordinary language philosophy and poststructural theories and its understanding of seeing as a conceptual category. Ludwig Wittgenstein in his work *Philosophical Investigations* writes about the concept of seeing "and its place among the concepts of experience."¹ We see things as we interpret them, therefore, we see them the way we interpret them and this approach to the concept of seeing is very close to Poststructuralists and their critique of vision and oculocentrism.

The Novel *Alice in Wonderland* and its sequel *Through the Looking-Glass*, written by mathematician and logician Lewis Carroll, are taken for case study because they are cited as examples in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1986, 193.

Rabbit or duck

“Alice has never liked occultism. Not that the implausible surprises her. She knows more than anyone about fabulous, fantastic, unbelievable things [...] But she’s always seen what she talks about. She’s observed all the marvels first-hand. She’s been ‘in wonderland’. She hasn’t simply imagined, ‘intuited’. Induced, perhaps? Moreover, from a distance. And across partitions? Going through the looking-glass, that’s something else again.”²

Alice has always seen what she was talking about, just as her creator Lewis Carroll. *Alice in Wonderland* and its sequel *Through the Looking-Glass* seem like children’s stories but we cannot open either of Alice’s books and read for more than a page or two without encountering some logical puzzle.

Lewis Carroll was born Charles Lutwidge Dodgson in 1832 in Daresbury, England, one of eleven children in the family of an active cleric of the Church of England.³ His gift for mathematics earned him a position of lecturer at Christ Church College at Oxford where he stayed for the rest of his life, despite being totally unsuccessful as a tutor. Namely, Carroll taught Euclidian geometry, algebra, and arithmetic at the level of a first-year undergraduate course today, and his attempts to do serious mathematics were feeble. He was a poor mathematician by conventional standards. His later work on Euclid’s parallel appeared unimportant because he failed to master the calculus.⁴ Carroll was not aware of works on Euclid’s parallel by mathematicians in mainland Europe, nor even by mathematicians in England,⁵ and when he would come across a research into a problem in mathematics or logic, his interest would wane.

Namely, the beginning of the 19th century was a time of important research and major discoveries in the field of non-Euclidian geometry. More precisely, hyperbolic and elliptic geometries were discovered and recognized, both of them contradictory to Euclid’s fifth postulate, which had been elaborated on by many mathematicians ever since Euclid published it. The first significant discovery since Euclid’s time was the discovery of hyperbolic geometry in 1829 by the Russian mathematician Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, the first scientist to claim that Euclid’s geometry was not the only possible geometry, nor the only perceptual structure of our Universe.⁶

“[...] but she’s always seen what she talks about.”

² Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which is Not One*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1985, 12.

³ Burt L. Monroe (ed.), *A Mathematical Approach to Proportional Representation: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll*, New York, Springer Science–Business Media, 1996, 2.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ In Two-Dimensional Geometry, the parallel postulate, also called Euclid’s fifth postulate, states: if a line segment intersects two straight lines forming two interior angles on the same side that sum to less than two right angles, then the two lines, if extended indefinitely, meet on that side on which the angles sum to less than two right angles.

⁶ James W. Anderson, *Hyperbolic Geometry*, London, Springer, 2005.

Carroll incorporated his own findings and researches in the field of geometry and logic into his stories of Alice's strange experiences in the land of 'wonder' and the other side of mirror, and we can recognize them by careful reading.⁷

Nearly a hundred years after the 1865 publication of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Ludwig Wittgenstein refers to Lewis Carroll in his work *Philosophical Investigations*, comparing the ease and/or difficulty of reading a word's reflection in the mirror.⁸ Alice had trouble reading the text of the poem *JABBERWOCK*. Therefore, she would have to stop and think in order to read it, whereas she recognized and perceived other objects and beings quite normally as if they were not merely reflections in the Looking-Glass.⁹

In the second part of *Philosophical Investigations*, chapter eleven begins with an analysis of the word 'see', precisely what is the concept of vision and its place among the concepts of experience. Through the example of Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure, Wittgenstein refers to vision as double aspect, "half visual experience, half thought"¹⁰ and raises the question of criteria of visual experience. Wittgenstein believes that if we look at an object we don't have to also think of it, but when looking is accompanied by pronouncing the word, actually the name of that object or phenomenon, then it is certain that we think of what we see.

Alice behaves characteristically during her journey through Wonderland, as well as through the Looking-Glass. Namely, she keeps explaining to herself everything that she perceives, she thinks aloud, and thus the reader perceives with her the characters and the areas she goes through. But what are Alice's descriptions like? What is her behaviour like in the bizarre situations in which she finds herself from time to time? Alice translates to herself bizarre situations in her familiar way of thinking, and thus manages to stay calm and in a manner understand what is happening to her. When the Rabbit addressed her, with an order "Why, Mary Ann, what are you doing out here? Run home this moment, and fetch me a pair of gloves and a fan! Quick, now!" She says to herself: "He took me for his housemaid. How surprised he'll be when he finds out who I am! But I'd better take him his fan and gloves – that is, if I can find them."

Thus, Alice explains unfamiliar events and conversations in the way she learned at home or school using her 'language game.' While falling through the Rabbit's hole, she begins to calculate and to guess how many miles underground she is, and in that way she 'comprehends' what is happening to her. "I wonder what Latitude or Longitude I've got to?" (Alice had not the slightest idea what Latitude was, or Longitude either, but she thought they were nice grand words to say.)¹¹

Alice knew that she had learned at school about Latitude and Longitude and that they had something to do with space. Therefore, she used the learned 'language-game' at the right place although she did not understand it quite well.

⁷ Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015.

⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 198.

⁹ Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking-Glass*, <https://birrell.org/andrew/alice/IGlass.pdf>, ac. 11. 02. 2015.

¹⁰ Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 194.

¹¹ Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, op. cit., 8.

Here we come to the issue of perception of space and how people see space. In order to present in a plane what we see, we need the knowledge of Euclid's geometry, and thus we establish a field for visual communication. Our habits and education are significant factors that influence perception: we observe things and see pictures on the basis of our education.

Is Cartesian representation of space the only possible way of representation? If we look at children's drawings, we shall see that they are representing space differently,¹² but do they see it differently? We can find out if we recall our own perception of space when we were kids. Things looked a little bit different didn't they? Everything seemed bigger and our relation to space was more direct before width, height and depth were introduced.

Lewis Carroll plays with space and its dimensions in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, but still stays within the frame of Euclidean geometry. Whereas in its sequel *Through The Looking-Glass*, published six years later in 1871, he introduces new visions of space.¹³

A big game of chess

In keeping with the topic of language as a game: Wittgenstein compares it with games (board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games) in which he finds a range of similarities that overlap and cross (*Philosophical Investigations*, §66). Wittgenstein's comparison of language with games is analyzed by Stanley Cavell in his book of essays *Must We Mean What We Say?*,¹⁴ in which he claims that this analogy with games helps us to see the following:

- a) A game is not (and could not be) 'everywhere circumscribed by rules' (§68).
 - b) 'Following a rule' is an activity we learn against the background of learning innumerable other activities (e.g. obeying orders, taking and giving directions, repeating), but at the same time rules can be misinterpreted.
 - c) Rules do not 'determine' what a game is. We can play a game without learning or formulating its rules or without having mastered the concept of the game (§31).
 - d) As in language, there is not one set of characteristics which all games share.
- Therefore, for Wittgenstein 'following a rule' is the same as 'practice', as 'playing a game'.¹⁵

Chess is very often cited as an example of the 'game' in *Investigations*, although it is a game with the most definite rules that must be followed in order for chess to be played correctly, and for us to be able to call it chess. But Wittgenstein gives us an

¹² Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 198.

¹³ Lewis Carroll worked on fifth postulate of Euclidean geometry in that period of time and we can assume that he somehow 'applied' his knowledge in his work *Through the Looking-Glass*.

¹⁴ Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, 49.

¹⁵ Ibid, 50.

example of a chess game in which the players yell and stamp their feet while playing (\$200), or speak words or phrases that only they are used to saying as jokes. If presented schematically, in moves, a game of chess like this would not involve the accompanying behavior of the players, and it would look like an ordinary game of chess. However, those attending this game 'live' and who don't know firmly grasp the rules would likely think that the players' behavior (yelling and stamping their feet) is part of the game rules.

Through the Looking-Glass is a story conceived just as a game of chess, in which Alice, the main character, is a white pawn on the move. At the beginning of the novel, the chess game is presented in moves to the end, actually until the final checkmate of the Red King. In the preface, the author explains that the chess problem is correctly resolved as far as the moves are concerned (except for small alterations such as the 'castling' of the three Queens). Therefore, the chess game, actually the chess problem, highlighted at the beginning of the story has been taken as the foundation or concept for *Through the Looking-Glass*. All other unusual events are like the 'yelling and stamping feet,' which Wittgenstein mentions in *Investigations* (\$200). In the story we find a series of characteristics that are directly generated from chess rules. One of them is the fast movement of the Queen, which, as a chess figure, can make unlimited moves in all directions, including moving diagonally and, if there are no obstacles, across the entire board in a single move. Then, there is the struggle between the Red (Black) Knight and the White Knight in which the White Knight wins and saves Alice (a white pawn) clearing her way and giving her time to reach the brook at the end of the chess board, the eighth square, where she will become the Queen, (in accordance with the chess rule which allows a pawn to become the queen once it reaches the eighth square).¹⁶

Cavell thinks that "Wittgenstein does not discuss whether language games *ought* to be played", but what is discussed is whether:

- 1) human beings ought to behave like the creatures we think of as human;
- 2) the world ought to be different from what it is.¹⁷

"I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different, people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize – then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him."¹⁸

This, Wittgenstein's understanding of the language, applies to human beings in general, but could also be applied to the differences in perceiving the reality inside the

¹⁶ "So you will, when you've crossed the next brook," said the White Knight. "I'll see you safe to the end of the wood – and then I must go back, you know. That's the end of my move." Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking-Glass*, op. cit., 115.

¹⁷ Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, 50.

¹⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 230.

human race. Therefore, one language game could be understandable to one part of the population, while the other part could see the same reality in a different way and it will be still the same reality but observed from the place of difference.

In other words, is there a way of seeing the world differently from the way the dominant civilization sees it?

“Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our style of painting arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian, for instance.) Is it merely a question of pleasing and ugly?”¹⁹

Cavell believes that “we learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others to project them into further contexts.”²⁰ But acceptance of these projections and their understanding needn't be the one we wanted. Cavell continues that Wittgenstein calls our sharing of ‘projections’ and direction of their motion and the whole whirl of this motion ‘forms of life’.

Here we could wonder whether there is a connection between Cavell's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ‘forms of life’, i.e. transmission of words in certain contexts and relation to the language and text as the only possible structure of life in poststructuralism.

Miško Šuvaković, in his work *Surplus Life: The Theory and Philosophy of Contemporary Transitional Art and Form of Life*, analyzes the term ‘form of life’ in the context of the difference between the conception of ‘life’ in cultural studies and the philosophical interpretation of life in biopolitical philosophy. “However, the term *form of life* involves the life which can't be separated from its form, the life in which it is impossible to isolate something we could take as *mere* or *naked life*. [...] In cultural studies is postulated the postpoststructuralistic thesis that there isn't a *naked life* and there is always a question about textual *agents* of representation and presentation within closed cultural systems. Life is presented as a text or ‘non-naked life.’”²¹

Raven and a writing desk

For Wittgenstein learning is based on believing, but at the same time the mathematical truth is independent of whether human beings know it or not. Hence the sentences 1) ‘human beings believe that two times two is four,’ and 2) ‘two times two is four’ don't have the same meaning. The latter is a mathematical proposition and the former means that humans have arrived at the mathematical proposition. He continues with another example: “Even if everybody believed that two times two was five it would still be four?” and “would it be wrong? (Is a coronation wrong? To beings different from ourselves it might look extremely odd.)”²²

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Stanley Cavell, op. cit., 52.

²¹ Miško Šuvaković, “Višak života: Teorija i filozofija savremene tranzicijske umetnosti i forme života”, *AM Journal of Art and Media Studies*, Issue No. 1, 2012, str. 12.

²² Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 227.

Throughout her travels in Wonderland and through the Looking-Glass, Alice was often confronted with riddles and strange events that the local residents took for granted, or even considered logical. At Mad Hatter and March Hare's tea party Alice was asked to answer a very unusual riddle: "Why is a raven like a writing-desk?" We receive no answer to this riddle in the novel because Mad Hatter himself, who had asked Alice the question, did not know the answer. Only in the preface to a later edition, pressed by readers, does Carroll give the most sensible answer: because they both produce few notes, therefore they are both *flat*. Although this answer seems to make sense, Carroll does not want to answer this question in the chapter *A Mad Tea-Party*, nor the other questions that Alice asked. Mad Hatter and his companions were captured in time, their clock stopped and constantly shows six o'clock – tea time.

We have already mentioned that Carroll was researching non-Euclidean geometries, and at the same time, hyperbolic and elliptic geometry, on which he himself was working were discovered elsewhere in the world. Today, knowing the postulates of these geometries and their connection with Einstein's theory of relativity, we may conclude that Carroll found the inspiration for his novels in mathematics and logic.²³ Wittgenstein writes his *Investigations* a hundred years later, with familiarity of these scientific achievements, yet he poses similar questions from the philosophic point of view: "Even if everybody believed that two times two was five, it would still be four?" and "would it be wrong?"²⁴ Namely, non-Euclidean geometries have proved that parallel lines do not exist, but we still behave as if the fifth postulate of Euclid geometry is valid. Is our belief incorrect or is it valid only for a civilization based upon Hellenistic philosophy? Euclid's fifth postulate is valid to us – the same as it is to people who believe that two times two is five – and it is correct for us, although the result is four.

Are we, just like the company at the tea party, captured in time at a round table and change our places around it?²⁵

Let's return to the concept of vision and how it is analyzed in *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein emphasizes that we look at a technical drawing in a different way from the way in which we look at a painting, and he distinguishes the concept of *interpretation* of what we see from *seeing*, classifying the concept of interpretation as thinking, an action, whereas *seeing* is merely a physiological state. "But if a sentence can strike me as a painting in words, and the very individual word in the sentence as a picture, then it is no such marvel that a word uttered in isolation and without purpose can seem to carry a particular meaning in itself."²⁶ Every act of seeing, every picture can be described by words, and the description depends on the one who describes it, who translates his own seeing into words. Whether vision is a matter of perception or a textual construct – was the question asked by poststructuralists? – and

²³ James W. Anderson, op. cit.

²⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 227.

²⁵ Mad Hatter, March Hare and Dormouse don't have time to wash tea-things between whiles and they keep moving around the table changing seats 'as the things get used up'.

²⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 215.

Jacques Derrida's utterance "I don't know what perception is and I don't believe that anything like perception exists" it gives us a better picture of the ocularcentrism crisis that emerged under the influence of poststructuralist theories.²⁷ Deconstructionism has always been encouraging to feminist thought, and the initial connection was the relation towards the *vision* in the western patriarchal culture. Feminists' critique of ocularcentrism and phallogocentrism owes to Lacan's psychoanalysis and to Derrida's critique of logocentrism as well.

Despite the mutation of Feminist theory since its appearance in 1949,²⁸ one presumption has been valid: that freedom is being an active observer, a beholder of gaze instead of being a passive object of looking. Actually, this relation toward ocularcentrism, and thus toward phallogocentrism – man is the one who is looking, the owner of the gaze, and woman is the object of looking – was the connection that the feminist movement establishes with poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories. Luce Irigaray was a direct 'disciple' of the Lacanian psychoanalytic school in Paris,²⁹ but through her research into the role of vision in the constitution of the linguistic/psychological subject³⁰ she was compelled to confront Lacan's concept of the Mirror Stage,³¹ the formation of the ego through seeing one's own reflection in the mirror.³² For Irigaray the mirror, which gives reflection to the ego and in that way reassures it and forms it, is *flat* and thus replicates the picture that is merely a copy of the self. Irigaray's critique refers to the feminine narcissistic identification with this reflection in *flat* mirrors, which keep them imprisoned in male specular economy as objects of exchange, commodities. For Irigaray the only solution would be to break the mirror and to go through it just as Alice does in *Through the Looking-Glass*.³³ The mirror gives us the reflection that supports the sameness and this repeating of reflection doesn't give a *different* image from the one we meet in the street, at work, in media, or wherever a "surveyor's" framing gaze reaches.³⁴

²⁷ Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes*, London, University of California Press, 1994, 497.

²⁸ Since the first publication of Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*.

²⁹ In the 1960s, Irigaray started attending the psychoanalytic seminars of Jacques Lacan and joined the École Freudienne de Paris, directed by Lacan.

³⁰ Irigaray worked on a dissertation focused on the study of the language of dementia patients based actually on the differences between the language of male and female patients.

³¹ Martin Jay, *op. cit.*, 530.

³² Jacques Lacan, *Écrits*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, 77.

³³ Luce Irigaray, *op. cit.*, 12.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

The gaze from the place of *difference*

“‘I don’t know’, Alice said doubtfully. ‘I don’t want to be anybody’s prisoner. I want to be a Queen.’”³⁵

The concept *difference* occupies an important place in poststructuralist theory after Derrida introduced it, and indicates “the middle voice. It precedes and sets up the opposition between passivity and activity.”³⁶ Poststructuralist-feminist reflections import the concept of difference as the key concept and the stem of all other theses, although the concept of difference is not conceived as a relation between a man and a woman in this particular case, but as the standpoint from which one talks, looks or writes.³⁷ Derrida points out that *difference* is not merely a concept nor a word, but the place from which the speech of *difference* emerges – the place that excludes any sensibility whether it is seeing or hearing. And he continues: “Difference can refer to the whole complex of its meanings at once, for it is immediately and irreducibly multivalent, something which will be important for the discourse I am trying to develop.”³⁸ Therefore, *difference* is the place where the discourse of the individual develops beyond the system of opposites of the subject and the *Other one*. In other words, this place becomes a hope for creating a different language that is not subjugated to the opposites of logocentrism, ocularcentrism and phallogocentrism, and thus it creates the possibility of free expression of all the *different ones*.

While the concept the *Other one* refers to the Other one from the speaker’s standpoint (mainly referring to a woman in psychoanalysis),³⁹ the place of the subject’s desire, *difference* is a place deprived of tensions of binary opposites. Overcoming of these “oppositely constructed binaries whose logic usually declines to One: the Other (from the One’s standpoint)”⁴⁰ actually is one of the strategies of French theoretical – psychoanalytic poststructuralist feminisms. In other words the removal of boundaries between binaries and opposites is related not only to “women’s positions and positions of femininity in the system of language/intelligible, but also to the theories of subjectivity in general.”⁴¹ Thus, when we speak of *others* and their position, we don’t refer only to a woman and her position, but to *others* versus the Western system of representation, versus the Cartesian conception of the world. In that way, the struggle of feminist movements for ‘women’s rights’ becomes the matrix and the model for everyone who doesn’t belong to the male/western/Cartesian civilization of

³⁵ Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking-Glass*, op. cit.

³⁶ Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1979, 130.

³⁷ Dragana Stojanović, “Razlika kao mesto *odakle*: teorijsko izvođenje telesnosti i rodnosti iz perspektive feminizama razlike”, *AM Journal of Art and Media Studies*, Issue No. 6, 2014, 28.

³⁸ Jacques Derrida, op. cit., 137.

³⁹ “The Other, in my terminology, can thus only be the Other sex.” Jacques Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality – Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972–1973*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1999, 39.

⁴⁰ Dragana Stojanović, op. cit., 31.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

speaking from their *difference*. That's why for Julia Kristeva "collective identities [are] things of the past and illusion, whereas dialogues of writing and speaking of different and brave individualities represent a real possibility of changing the system in which we currently exist as subjects imprisoned in constructs of collective identities."⁴²

Led by this analogy, we could wonder what the gaze would be from the position of a child or someone who comes from a culture different from ours?

In her travels through Wonderland, Alice often drinks beverages and eats cakes that cause her to change size, from huge to tiny. When we speak of another point of view, we normally mean a different perspective – a bird's-eye or worm's-eye view, for example – from above or below the position of looking. However, these angles give us the *same* picture, only distorted by the perspective. If we take the example of tessellation of the Euclidean plane,⁴³ we shall see that there have been numerous possibilities of solving this mathematical-geometrical problem through the history of civilization. Different nations in different epochs and cultures have been tessellating various surfaces, and on these examples we can perceive a great number of possibilities and ways of tessellation which depict *different* cultures, *different* mathematics, *different* discourses in solving the same problem: tessellation of the Euclidean plane.⁴⁴ (Pictures, examples 1 and 2) Are these examples of plane tessellation really *different* or is it only 'myriad' ways of completing the *same* task? Is it possible to define and/or represent the gaze from the place of *difference*? Could we articulate that gaze with the existing language?

The answers to these questions might be found in the example of the Incas' paving the planes in the 15th century. Namely, stone walls supporting the terraces with farming land and the steep slopes on which they lived are not an example of a plane paving within the tessellation definition – the use of symmetrical slabs (wallboards) in a repeated series, but yet it constitutes a perfect method of paving the planes. Their perfection was reflected in their functionality, i.e. the perfect covering of a plane with slabs making it so stable that it could resist earthquakes and other natural disasters. Although, the Incas' paving of planes does not constitute a plane tessellation according to its definition,⁴⁵ it still solves the problem of covering Euclid's plane with slabs. (Picture example 3)

Unlike other nations in various epochs, the Incas solved the problem applying a totally different method of plane paving (no two stones are identical). They applied a different 'calculation' which is not subjugated to the laws of Euclid's geometry, but when we look at these walls, we come to the conclusion that it has to do with a different gaze, the gaze from the point of difference. However, we can only recognize it is a different gaze, a different civilization. We can recognize it since the same, human

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ A tessellation of a flat surface is the tiling of a plane using one or more geometric shapes, called tiles, with no overlaps and no gaps.

⁴⁴ Tamara Brankovan, "k – uniformne teselacije euklidske ravni", <http://elibrary.matf.bg.ac.rs>, ac. 22. 02. 2016.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 3.

language is employed, but the rules of this language game are almost unknown to our civilization.

The territorial isolation and time distance of the Incas from our civilization made it possible for them to apply a totally different gaze and different laws of mathematics. Examples like these from the history of the human race help us conclude that a gaze from the point of difference is possible, but the dominant civilization and its system of communicating the information and circulating the goods and images do not allow its visibility.

A different perception, about which Carol and Wintegstein write and which is the topic of this study, is possible and does exist, but its maintenance in this globalist world of the post-Fordism is almost impossible. Only by passing through the Looking-Glass, as Alice did in Carol's novel, can we interrupt the replication of the image of the governing "specular economy"⁴⁶ and create room for forming a different gaze, and also for its presentation within the human.

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
"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him."⁴⁷



example 1: Aleksandra Jovanić, tessellation of pavement in Madrid

⁴⁶ Luce Irigaray, op. cit., 12.

⁴⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., 223.



example 2: Aleksandra Jovanić, photo of tessellation of tiles in Madrid



example 3: Inkas' wall, 15th Century, (photo by Đorđe Đorđević)