Beyond Fetish and Animism: Interpretations of the Autonomy of Commodities

**Abstract:** In recent decades, part of the human sciences has been dedicated to rethinking the separations between subjects and objects, or, in another sense, between nature and culture. If, in part of the Western context, this separation guaranteed the ontological primacy of subjects, other strands of thought have sought to rediscover the interactions between subjects and objects, including finding ways to establish the conditions of autonomy of objects by themselves. In particular and turning to the cultural context and the production of objects in capitalist societies, we ask about the conditions of autonomy of commodities. Depending on the perspective we adopt, the commodity loses its economic attribute, reappearing with other constitutive meanings. In this paper, we trace a brief conceptual course about the separations between subjects and objects and the contemporary interpretations that intend to undo such separation. First, we start with Sigmund Freud’s critical comments about the animistic practices of indigenous people and Karl Marx’s comments about commodity fetishism. According to Peter Stallybrass (2009), Marx would not be antagonistic to the fetish as a possible cultural form, but solely a critic of the commodity fetish in capitalist societies. Losing its harmful character, the fetish reappears as a potential agent of relations between human and non-human bodies, according to Latour (2005). Finally, we speculate on the commodity-object to reactivate the interlacements between subjects and objects in contemporaneity.

**Keywords:** fetish; animism; commodity; object; autonomy.

**Omnipotence of thought**

In *Totem and Taboo*,¹ Freud reports that some neurotic processes would have as a consequence the attribution of life to inanimate things, as if things dictated the behavior of human subjects. Thus, toys, stones, trees, and other elements would come to life, being treated as relics worthy of being carefully preserved. To this way of relating the psyche to the world, Freud would give the name of “omnipotence of thought”², that is, a thought that supposes an exterior world organized and in strict correspondence with what the subject thinks – as if animate subjects and inanimate things

² Ibid, 89, 94.

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maintained an intricate conversation. This neurotic formation would have, among other consequences, the elaboration of complex private rituals, in which the individual negotiates his demands and organizes his life in dialogue with objects.

Freud tells us that these pathologies resemble the cultural behavior of so-called primitive societies, in which social groups were in constant dialogue with forces of nature, animals, and all variety of objects. He recalls that this system of thought was called animism⁵ – where non-human entities were supposedly endowed with rationality and a soul. ‘Primitivist animism’ would thus be in diametrical opposition to the separations between subject and object, or between culture and nature, normalized by the assumptions of rationality in the West.⁴ In this perspective, animist thought would have no correspondence with reality, for which the self-reflective consciousness, the cogito, is an exclusive instrument of human reason, and this is separated from the world of things precisely by the activity of thinking. Likewise, in “The Cultural Biography of Things”⁵, Igor Kopytoff points out the opposition that subject and object (in Kopytoff’s analysis, the commodities) occupy within Western rationality:

In contemporary Western thought, we admit, as a relatively peaceful point, that things [...] represent the natural universe of commodities. We place people on the opposite side, representing the natural universe of individualization and singularization. This conceptual polarization between individualized persons and commodified things is recent and, in cultural terms, exceptional.⁶

Like Freud, Karl Marx is considered one of the renewers of the concept of fetish, which in some points can be approximated to animism. Although Freud addressed the concept of fetishism in his work,⁷ his interpretation focuses on the fetish as a ‘deviant’ erotic behavior, without elaborating the historical track that forms this concept. On the other hand, as for animism, Freud directly states that it is a mode of thought relative to other cultural perspectives. Animism, in Freud, appears as a manifestation of the incompatibility between cultures that separate subjects and objects from others that link them, so it seemed more useful to comment on the concept of animism in Freud to introduce this text. In any case, both fetish and animism are interpretations by the European colonizer about the cultural practices of the people.

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⁵ Ibid, 81.
⁴ However, in other contexts, Freud is recognized as one of those who undoes the primacy of human consciousness, separating the ego from the unconscious, and therefore propitiating the questioning of the subject within the human sciences, as argued by Tiago Barcelos Pereira Salgado in “A virada não humana na comunicação,” Revista ECO-Pós 21, 2 (2018): 1–11.
⁶ Ibid, 89–90.
with whom they came in contact and in subsequent relations of exploitation. Fetish and animism were the designations adopted by Europeans to circumscribe some practices that differed from their own religious canons and their economic and social organization. When Freud and Marx appropriate these concepts, their meanings are already altered and diluted, and they use them to think of other meanings in their own societies.

However, in recent decades, different strands of Western thought that review the separations between subjects and objects have pluralized. Gathered within (but not solely) the notion of the non-human turn, such proposals cross the fields of humanities and social sciences “within a complex swarm of other intellectual, affective, scientific, and political-economic trends”, according to Jane Bennett. As discourses on the interactions between subjects, objects, animals, natural, and artificial elements are repositioned, also the concepts of fetish and animism appear in new contexts and with other meanings. In particular, I propose the question about the intersections between subjects and objects in the cultural field of capitalism and through the category of fetish: if, in the analysis constructed by Marx, the commodity becomes a fetish and starts to determine the subject, in other theories the fetish ceases to represent a magical artifice to be understood as a way to relate subjects and objects, indicating a certain constitutive equivalence between the two. Starting from this reinterpretation of the concept of fetish, shouldn’t we also relate it to the interactions between subjects and commodities?

Throughout this paper, I argue about possible forms of autonomy of the commodities, first through some theoretical positions found in Peter Stallybrass, Igor Kopytoff and Roberto Esposito, who, directly or indirectly, displace the Marxist concept of commodity fetishism, finding ways to individualize or singularize the commodities. Next, I address the concept of fetish according to the interpretation of Bruno Latour, intending to connect it to the problem of the autonomy of commodities.

It is worth pointing out that these recent theories about the forms of interaction between subjects and objects participate in a broader re-examination of the systems of thought and cultural practices of indigenous peoples. In fact, the central

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8 About the emergence of the concept of fetish and its historical and etymological transits, I based myself, among others, on the article by Rogerio Brittes W. Pires “Religious fetishism, merchandise fetishism, sexual fetishism: transpositions and connections”. This article describes the first systematization of the concept of fetish and the different interpretations that the fetish acquired in the West, being eventually and differentially incorporated in the work of Freud and Marx. In Rogerio Brittes W. Pires “Fetichismo religioso, fetichismo da mercadoria, fetichismo sexual: transposições e conexões,” Revista de Antropologia 57, 1 (2014): 347–91.

9 Ibid.


11 Peter Stallybrass, O casaco de Marx. (Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, 2008).


13 Roberto Esposito, As pessoas e as coisas (São Paulo: Rafael Copetti Editor, 2016).

14 Bruno Latour, Reflexão sobre o culto moderno dos deuses fe(i)tiches (Santa Catarina: EDUSC, 2002).
problem of this text began to emerge through some works that deal with the thought of indigenous peoples, in particular *The Falling Sky*,\(^\text{15}\) *Ideas to Postpone the End of the World*\(^\text{16}\) and some books and texts by Philippe Descola.\(^\text{17}\) However, since I focused my argument on the interaction between the concept of fetish and commodities, I preferred to deal with authors who reposition these concepts within the debate on capitalist commodities. Even Latour, in this context, is interested in commenting on how the concept of fetish has been elaborated and displaced in the Western perspective.

Finally, the notion of an autonomy or individuality of the commodity is approximated to the idea of translating things from within, according to Walter Benjamin. Beyond its mere economic and utilitarian meaning, as I describe from Marx’s theory, the commodity appears as the bearer of a profound historicity, demanding from us an interpretative faculty that is capable of witnessing its own language.

**Commodity fetishism**

The concept of commodity fetishism, which appears in the first chapter of Karl Marx’s *Capital*,\(^\text{18}\) is fundamental to understand the relations of production in capitalism. Marx tells us that the commodity is formed by two characteristics, which on many levels oppose each other: the commodity has a use-value and an exchange-value. The use-value refers to the utility of the commodity, to its specific function according to an individual and social demand. But in addition to its utility, the commodity also has a *material* quality, that is, it is a tangible, sensorial object that occupies a space and has an appearance that changes over time. In the first chapter of *Capital*, several times Marx mentions the ‘body’ of the commodity.\(^\text{19}\) Thus, in relation to its use value, the commodity, besides fulfilling a utilitarian function, can also be touched, smelled, seen, heard or devoured, without its functional order, its causal utility, ceasing to be fulfilled.

The exchange-value refers to the commodity in the circuit of capitalist economic exchanges. Beyond its finished physical characteristics, its final form as an object endowed with use-value, the commodity can be traced in relation to the productive history of its material composition. Every commodity is the fruit of an organized labor system that, depending on its procedural alignment, can start on a plantation, go through the factory and end up in a store. However, before being sold, the commodity will be evaluated in relation to other products. As it is valued and projected in terms of exchange, the commodity’s production chain becomes abstract, its productive alignment enters into complex and basically indeterminate economic relations, while the

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\(^{15}\) Davi Kopenawa and Bruce Albert, *A Queda do céu – Palavras de um xamã yanomami* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2019).


\(^{19}\) Ibid, 166–71.
process of its making ceases to be discriminable to become something incorporeal, no
longer visible within the concrete dynamics of the productive forces. About the same
effect on exchange value, Michael Taussig, analyzing Capital, says that “a palace is
equal to a certain number of shoes, just as a pair of shoes is equal to a certain amount
of animal skin.”20 This abstraction would have the effect that “social relations between
people are camouflaged as social relations between things.”21 Thus, according to Marx,
the commodity becomes a ‘fetish’: it detaches itself from the processes involved in its
material production and appears to have created itself, as if it were endowed with a
rationality of its own.

By suggesting the concept of commodity fetishism, Marx proposes that the
spell of the exchange-value should be undone, so that the commodity reappears in its
concrete material form – as an effect of the organized labor, of the productive process,
that shaped it. However, understanding the commodity as a totality formed by the
integration of use value and exchange value does not seem to account for all of its
effects: beyond their concrete physical appearance and material history, commodities
are infiltrated by other events, and may become individualized. Separated from their
economic determination and their utilitarian efficacy, commodities will be invested
with other attributes: other forms of agency will be able to characterize them.

**The individuality of the commodity**

In Marx’s Coat,22 Peter Stallybrass is interested in the “material particularity”
of commodities and how this particularity escapes the “supersensible value”23 of the
exchange-value. Stallybrass starts from a personal example, concerning the clothes of
a deceased friend. The emptiness of the friend’s clothes activates the presence of his
memory, and the objects reveal the extent of its vivacity beyond their apparent inertia:

> If I wore the jacket, Allon wore me. He was there in the elbow puffs, puffs
> that in technical sewing jargon are called ‘memory’. He was there in the
> stains that were on the bottom of the jacket; he was there in the under-
> arm smell. Most of all, he was there in the smell.24

As a material particularity, the commodity will be endowed with sensory and
affective agency, establishing relationships that are not limited to economic exchang-
es: the commodity communicates, speaks of individual stories, of the bodies that
have passed through them, and of the interaction with these bodies. The closer the

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20 Michael Taussig, _O diabo e o fetichismo da mercadoria na América do Sul_ (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2010),
53–54.

21 Ibid, 54.

22 Peter Stallybrass, _O casaco de Marx_. (Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, 2008).

23 Ibid, 40.

commodity is to individual lives and memories, the more it absorbs singular traces – it carries the trails of what has passed through them, of people and their memories, of the living and the dead. And besides carrying the traces of these othernesses, the commodity carries itself. Beyond its exchange value, its always fluctuating and abstract status among other commodities, it acquires an affectation value, a potential individuality that, as such, can be transmitted to the extent that it is invested and passes on the forces that marks its body. The idea of an interaction between autonomous objects can remind us of the film *The Way Things Go* (1987), by the duo Peter Fischli and David Weiss, in which structures of objects from the artists’ studio collapse on each other, creating the sensation that the objects are characters endowed with an individuality of their own. According to Peter Fischli’s commentary, “the film creates the impression that things move on their own, without human help, becoming beings endowed with spirit and alive.”

If we want to insist even further on this point, we can return to Kopytoff, who in his analysis of a possible biography of commodities writes:

> For the most part, when the commodity is effectively outside the commodity sphere, its status is inevitably ambiguous and subject to the back and forth of facts and desires, as it is exposed to almost infinite attempts at singularization. Thus, various kinds of singularizations, many of them ephemeral, constantly accompany commodification [...]. Thus, even things built clearly have exchange value [...] end up absorbing the other type of value, which is non-monetary and goes beyond exchange value.

Similar to Stallybrass, who suggests a “particularity” of the commodity, Kopytoff speaks of “singularization”. Commodities acquire this singularity after they are produced and commodified, that is, outside of their serial uniformity, and when they come into contact with the individuals who own them – the point is that the commodity’s singularization is absolutely common, it is even inevitable in its process of social circulation. As soon as it is removed from the circuit of economic exchanges, the commodity becomes a vector for countless individual agency. The idea of commodities removed from traditional economic circuits can also remind us of some Pop Art works made by Andy Warhol, such as the *Brillo Box* (1964): it is a serial object separated from its copies, at the same time identical and different from its peers.

In *Persons and Things*, Roberto Esposito denies the individuality of commodities in the “circuit of serial production”, but recognizes their immediate transformation when they are particularized:

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27 Roberto Esposito, *As pessoas e as coisas* (São Paulo: Rafael Copetti Editor), 2016.
28 Ibid, 105.
As soon as they enter our homes, rediscovering a relationship with our bodies, things become private again, as if each one acquired its own name [...]. From then on, we begin to feel linked to them by a bond that goes far beyond their market price. Those things carry the marks of our hands, the sign of our looks, the profile of our experience.29

Individualized, the commodity becomes an agent: it affects the subject, it communicates with those who can no longer just verify that they possess them. Even away from its economic fetish, the commodity continues to communicate: like animistic elements and fetish objects, the commodity acquires a certain equivalence with the subjects with whom they come into contact.

Still according to Stallybrass, Marx proposes an overcoming of the commodity fetishism, but not of the fetish itself, when it is characterized by other statements. The fetish suggests a re-encounter of the particular in things, rescuing their potencies beyond the rigid separations between subject and object. “Only [...] in a Cartesian and post-Cartesian paradigm that the life of matter is relegated to the trash can of the ‘merely’ – the bad fetish that the adult will leave behind as a childish thing in order to pursue the life of the mind.”30

To fetishize commodities means, in one of Marx’s least understood ironies, to reverse the entire history of fetishism. For it means fetishizing the invisible, the immaterial, the supra-sensible. [...] Thus, for Marx, fetishism is not the problem; the problem is commodity fetishism.31

The accusation of the fetish as an alien and primitive cultural form will also be rethought by Bruno Latour, who in On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods,32 proposes that the empiricist methods of Western science would also be fetishistic. Latour takes as an example some experiments carried out in Louis Pasteur’s laboratory. When a scientific hypothesis is verified, it becomes a fact, and this fact gains autonomy from the process that built it. That is, in the same way that Europeans saw West African peoples as fetishists for creating objects and then perceiving these objects as autonomous, as if the objects had magically created themselves, European scientists, based on empirical methods, also create their facts in the laboratory and then treat these facts as if they had a life of their own:

As we manufacture the facts in our laboratories, with our colleagues, our instruments and our hands, they would become, by a magical effect of inversion, something that no one has ever manufactured [...] After the

31 Ibid, 41–42.
32 Bruno Latour, Reflexão sobre o culto moderno dos deuses fe(i)tiches (Santa Catarina: EDUSC, 2002).
work of construction, antifetishists maintain that facts would ‘gain their autonomy’.\(^{33}\)

Like other researchers of the term ‘fetish’ and its etymological and historical transits, Latour proposes a series of inversions to show that the Europeans that came into contact with North African peoples were as fetishistic as they claimed the others were. As Roger Sansi\(^{34}\) writes, the accusation of fetishism would serve to “defend the ideology of the superiority of the West as modern culture, of today, over non-Western cultures, cultures of yesterday, which dwell in the past. It is about denying the contemporaneity of Europe and Africa.”\(^{35}\)

Latour’s whole argument, after all, will be about the false dichotomy between modern and non-modern, or between fetishists and non-fetishists, because both preserve their own fetishes, attributing autonomy to objects constructed by themselves. In this sense, the scientific experiment is assimilated to the African fetish. Both are fetishists, except that Africans do not separate the fact that they have constructed their objects from the attribution of effects that they confer upon them. The abandonment of the separation between made object and autonomous object would give way, according to Latour, to the construction of new anthropological assumptions, where the separation between fetishists and non-fetishists, or between subjects and objects, would collapse, starting from the assumption that scientific objects are also fetishes – they detach themselves from their exterior production and gain autonomy in relation to the subjects that produced them. Being autonomous, they affect and organize their creators. Like any object, the fetish would be a fabrication that becomes autonomous.

We adopt, then, from this conception of the fetish, the assumption that the object is not an entity separate from the subject, precisely because it proposes different ways of interaction, intersection, and autonomy. By being created and, consequently, separating from it, the object also “surpasses” the subject a little, redistributing and tensing its modes of action. And if global capitalism tends to reify its individuals, attributing a mercantile appearance to the total form of the world,\(^{36}\) it is to the same extent that things are only reduced to commodities when their singularity is mitigated.

Like fetishes, commodities interact with those who made them. But this interaction is governed by some particular motives: the continuous affirmation of capital and its infinite reproduction, its economic spell, its abstraction. The advance of capital proposes a gradual dematerialization of the physical world, transformed into an advertising fable. Intermingled by the fauna of commodities and immersed in their natural habitat, which constitutes “the folklore of industrial man”\(^{37}\), we negotiate our

\(^{33}\) Ibid, 39.


\(^{35}\) Ibid, 124.

\(^{36}\) And, on the other hand, it is things that gain a humanized appearance: “The animated appearance of commodities highlights the objectified appearance of people.” Michael Taussig. O diabo e o fetichismo da mercadoria na América do Sul (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2010), 53–54.

\(^{37}\) Emanuelle Coccia, O bem nas coisas (Lisboa: Documenta, Sistema Solar e Fundação Carmona e Costa, 2016), 48.
lives with them. However, and as we have seen according to Stallybrass, Kopytoff, and Esposito, the commodity itself is subject to contradictions, and its classification varies according to circumstances. When moved away from economic circuits to other social spaces, and despite its function assigned by the use-value, it unfolds other appearances – it acquires a potential singularity, an individuality whose “drama lies in the uncertainty” of its own identity.

**Translating things**

It would be possible to take even further the argument about the individuality of commodities. From a certain perspective, commodities overflow the circuit of affections with subjects, summoning a language of its own. Walter Benjamin proposed that we must find ways to translate things from the inside, without applying our common language, but with a distinct interpretative capacity.

In “The Language of Things”, Hito Steyerl comments on Benjamin’s “On language as such and on the language of man”. According to Steyerl, in this text Benjamin wonders about a possible language of things – not only ordinary objects, but also mountains, animals and practices, “law, technology, art, the language of music and sculpture”. Things become comprehensible through translations, but, according to Steyerl, the Benjaminian concept of translation would not be “between” the language of things and human language, but “within” them and “at the base of language itself”. Benjamin’s theory suggests that, before things were named and classified by the human word, they would hold a “residue of the word of God, who created the world through speech”. This first language would have been replaced by human language, which “categorizes, fixes, and identifies its components in what Benjamin called the language of judgment.” This enclosure of things through a language that judges represents a diminishing of their latent potential, a muting of their fundamental forces. So, instead of curtailment, Benjamin proposes a translation that understands each thing as a witness to a complex and encrypted temporality, and whose translation must consider the open potential of each. Garbage, for example, signals a long historical journey and testifies the very history of modernity: “Modest and even abject objects become hieroglyphs in whose dark prism social relations were frozen and in fragments.”

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, 2.
44 Ibid.
A thing is never just something, but a fossil in which a constellation of forces is petrified. According to Benjamin, things are never just inert objects, passive items or lifeless husks available to the documentary gaze. But they consist of tensions, forces, hidden powers, which are being exchanged. While this view may border on magical thinking, according to which things are invested with supernatural powers, it is also classical materialist. Because the commodity is not understood as a mere object, but as a condensation of social forces. [...] It can go beyond representation and become creative in the sense of a transformation of the relations that define it.46

As in Kurt Schwitters’ *Merzbau* (1923–1937) or Arman’s *Accumulations* (1960–1964), the association of discarded or ‘passive’ objects becomes a living material archive that questions our capacity for legibility. It is, then, a matter of transforming the relations that we produce with objects – and, in this context, with commodities. The commodity occupies a tangible space, from where it communicates its signals. It is up to us to learn how to translate them, interpreting their rumors. Instead of enclosing matter in its apparent inertia, we must find ways to rehabilitate ordinary objects, even those that populate our everyday lives – the commodities. After disentangling their fetishistic opacity and the frantic unrest of their advertising discursiveness, commodities reappear as testimonies of their material process and of the complex historicity they carry with them – as a vector of potential agencies with humans and of a recreated individuality, capable also of escaping from itself.

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46 Ibid.


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