Abstract: This paper aims at hypothesizing that the issue of technology could never be considered separate from the creative act. We develop the hypothesis starting from Heidegger’s opposition of technology and the poietic, which we interpret through the dialectic between the performative and constative function of the hand. To overcome the Heideggerian problem of Enframing, we introduce the question of singularity inherent in every poietic activity which, however, does not result in conceiving technology as an instrument. When defining the nature of such poietic singularization we employ Spinoza’s concept of an inadequate idea – an idea that involves its cause but does not explain it. The inherent negativity of the inadequate idea generates the sphere in which the new appears as radical otherness. But in order to produce the new, that is, to perform it, technology has to be conceptualized and thus made an instrument – a singular instrument of the creative act.

Keywords: instrument; technology; inadequate idea; the new; invention; design.

Introduction

At the beginning of the essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (Die Frage nach der Technik) Martin Heidegger first says “(In what follows) we shall be questioning concerning technology” [fragen wir nach der Technik] and only a few lines below restates this utterance with a slight modification: “We shall be questioning concerning technology” [Wir fragen nach der Technik].¹ This sequence would refer to what Heidegger formulates as the difference between technology and the essence [Wesen] of technology which, he says, “is by no means anything technological.”² But there remains the question of what the order of italicizing the two words means here. And additionally, what would be the semantic difference between the same one of these words being emphasized and not? In the first case, questioning would mean

opposing – opposing the given technology. It appears that only after such questioning could Heidegger talk about “technology,” the technology, that is, its essence. Having that in mind, the difference this essay starts with could be considered temporal.

Reflecting on the widespread definition of technology as a “means to an end,” Heidegger formulates technology as “a contrivance [Einrichtung], or, in Latin, an instrumentum.” He introduces the instrumental conception of technology in order to provoke the suggested telic definition. Instrumentality is defined here through the Aristotelian fourfold causality, as the thinking based on the causa efficiens, the efficient cause. Therefore, a Heideggerian instrument would be the one which embodies the concept of Enframing [Gestell], thus making itself ontologically different from what Heidegger calls the Hand-Werk, the work of the hand. The lack of immediacy of the hand makes instruments differ from (simple) tools. Being detached from the hand, that is, being devoid of the prehensile function, the instrument becomes a device which no longer has the ability to hold, but behold. This subtle difference could also be found in Simondon when talking about the evolution of instruments and tools as technical devices:

The eighteenth century was the pivotal moment for the development of tools and instruments, if by tool one understands the technical object enabling one to prolong and arm the body in order to accomplish a gesture, and by instrument the technical object that enables one to prolong and adapt the body in order to achieve better perception; the instrument is a tool of perception. Some technical objects are both tools and instruments, but they can be called tools or instruments according to the predominance of their active function or of their perceptive function [...].

Simondon here does not efface the relationship between the instrument and the body. Instead, what he stresses is that the instrument frees the body from its performative function, the function to “accomplish a gesture”\(^8\). In the concept of instrument defined in this way there could be found the possibility to dialectize Heidegger’s

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3 Ibid., 4–5.
5 This refers to classical definitions of tools as technical devices created with the minimum of abstraction, which is reflected in their mimetic nature: a tool serves as an extension of a body part with the function of prehensility. A tool is not aimed at the abstraction of the prehensile function. Based on this trait, Cassirer distinguishes between instruments and tools: “What separates the instruments of fully developed technology from primitive tools is that they have, so to speak, detached and dissociated themselves from the model that nature is able to immediately offer them.” (emphasis added) Ernst Cassirer, “Form and Technology,” in Ernst Cassirer on Form and Technology: Contemporary Readings, ed. by Aud Sissel Hoel and Ingvild Folkvord (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 38.
6 The etymology of this word leads to the Latin prehensus, or prehendere.
conception of instrumentality residing in modern technology. The possibility of dialectizing it lies precisely in the rearrangement of the relations between the “active” and “perceptive function,” between praxis and theoria. Regarding the issue of instrumentality, the practice–theory opposition becomes even more important when we think it through the distinction between the arts and fine arts. The performative aspect of the hand then starts to decompose in favor of its theoretical disposition.

The Hand. The Sign

Is there a difference in meaning between the two questions of Heidegger with which he begins his essay? If there are none, why then does he start questioning with the repetition of the same question? These remarks become all the more important after the last words of the essay:

The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.9

What Heidegger recalls with the word “danger” is named destining [Geschick].10 Destining represents an important concept for the definition of Enframing: Enframing results from the destining of revealing. Thus, destining becomes what makes difference between Enframing and poiēsis, both of which refer to revealing – revealing what is concealed. While poiēsis stands for revealing as “bringing-forth,”11 the revealing of Enframing, that is, of Gestell is described as challenging-forth, or setting-upon [stellen]. The forcing of the concealed of this kind does ultimately result in disruption of the bringing-forth as disruption of poiēsis.12 And this is precisely what Heidegger designates as danger inherent in modern technology. The danger would then arise from the withdrawal of the hand in front of the destining, or the ordering. For in any work of the hand, essentially, there is nothing to handle, or hand.

“The hand is in danger.”13 These are the words with which Heidegger’s concern is recapitulated in the text of Derrida titled “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand.” Following the passages from Was heisst Denken?, Derrida introduces the discourse of the hand through the problem of sign. But while talking about the sign, he at the same time talks about monstrosity – monstrosity of the sign, the sign as a monster. Derrida finds the link between the two notions in one French translation of Was heisst

10 Here Geschick is linked with Geschichte (history), the essence of which is being determined by the act of destining. Heidegger, 24.
11 Heidegger distinguishes between the bringing-forth in itself (en heautōi; as in natural creation) and in another (en allōi; as in artistic or artisanal creation). Heidegger, 10–11.
12 Ibid., 30.
Denken?, at the point where Heidegger cites a passage from Hölderlin's Mnemosyne. Here the word Zeichen is translated as monstre.\textsuperscript{14} If we follow the etymology of the French word, we will come to the Latin verb monēre, which has the two sets of meaning. The first one covers the active verbs to tell (of), to suggest a course of action to, advise or warn, while the second one comprises the passive forms to serve as a reminder or warning to, (of omens, signs, etc.) to give warning of.\textsuperscript{15} This ambivalence in meaning – to (de)sign and to be the sign – resembles Heidegger’s description of the hand’s dual function:

The hand does not only grasp and catch, or push and pull. The hand reaches and extends, receives and welcomes – and not just things: the hand extends itself, and receives its own welcome in the hands of others [sie reicht sich und empfangt sich in der anderen]. The hand holds. The hand carries. The hand designs and signs [Die Hand zeichnet], presumably because man is a sign [der Mensch ein Zeichen ist].\textsuperscript{16}

On the basis of this capability of the hand to receive itself in the other, Heidegger distinguishes the hand from a simple prehensile organ. What makes the hand different is that it never deals only with the object as such, but primarily with its essence. That is, the work of the hand is the act of thinking. However, Heidegger links thinking with the thing thought as thought-provoking [Bedenklich]\textsuperscript{17}. He says that “everything thought-provoking gives [gibt] us to think. But it always gives that gift [gibt diese Gabe] just so far as the thought-provoking matter already is intrinsically what must be thought about.”\textsuperscript{18} This turn which Heidegger makes by interpreting thinking as a matter of giving, of the gift, remains crucial to the understanding of his handwork. Being a gift in its essence, thought always transcends the subject of thinking. Thinking thus stays external to the one who thinks. Therefore, thinking could only refer to the thing which is thought-provoking, the questionable thing. This means that the thought already resides in the thought-provoking: thinking does not mean inventing. Rather, it means bringing-forth, or receiving a thought from the other. A thought which “already is intrinsically what must be thought about” – in the other. It is among these words that we could search for the answer to Derrida’s question why Heidegger here in Was heisst Denken? links thinking with the hand and not with the eye and with light, as he does in other writings. It appears that, being open to the gift, Heidegger’s hand reaches the thought despite the occasion in which we still do not think. As Derrida explains, this kind of thought does not arise as a conceptual act:


\textsuperscript{17} Bedenklich could also be translated as “questionable.”

The hand’s being (das Wesen der Hand) does not let itself be determined as a bodily organ of gripping (als ein leibliches Greiforgan). It is not an organic part of the body intended [destinée] for grasping, taking hold [prendre], indeed for scratching, let us add even for catching on [prendre], comprehending, conceiving, if one passes from Greif to begreifen and to Begriff. Heidegger could not not let the thing say itself, and one can follow here [...] the whole problematic of the philosophical “metaphor”, in particular in Hegel, who presents the Begriff as the intellectual or intelligible structure “relieving” (aufhebend) the sensible act of grasping, begreifen, of comprehending by taking hold of, by laying one’s hands on, mastering and manipulating. If there is a thought of the hand or a hand of thought, as Heidegger gives us to think, it is not of the order of conceptual grasping.19

It is within the interval between “the thought of the hand” and “the hand of thought” the translation of the sign to the monster would be possible. The inversion Derrida makes does not only relativize the “work” of the hand, but also questions the possible work of thought, namely the work of the thought-provoking. This could be discerned in what Heidegger alludes to with the phrase “we still do not think.” With these words he describes the situation of not having control over thought, since the thing which has to be thought withdraws [entzieht]. It withdraws, that is, does not give us the thought. “But – withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal is an event [Entzug ist Ereignis],”20 Heidegger says. It is a real event, since it never occurs without affecting man, without drawing him by its withdrawal. This unfolds the content of the expression “man is a sign.” Saying that man is drawn by the withdrawal of the thing withdrawing, Heidegger explains that man points toward that very withdrawal.21 In this sense, he becomes a sign. However, could this mean that he becomes a monstrum?22

**Dangerous, Divine?**

“The hand cannot be spoken about without speaking of technics.”23 The inherent technicity of the hand brings uncertainty into defining the way it relates to revealing. In other words, technicity of the hand retains both the possibilities of bringing-forth and challenging-forth. Recalling the meaning of the Greek Technikon, Heidegger uses

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21 Ibid., 9, 18.
Aristotle’s distinction between technē and epistēmē, according to which the former is characterized by the state of contingency: “Technē is a mode of alētheuein. It reveals [...] whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another [was deshalb bald so, bald anders aussehen und ausfallen kann].”24 Heidegger’s insistence on the translation of aletheia as “unconcealment” instead of “truth” is closely related to the way he speaks of contingency, which belongs to revealing as bringing-forth. He therefore defines aletheia as that which precedes the certitude of truth:

Alētheia, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. Is alētheia then less than truth? Or is it more because it first grants truth as adequantio and certitudo, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening?25

These questions about alētheia as the possibility of truth supply Heidegger’s reflections on the end of philosophy. His account of the problem of end enters the sphere of Being as a metaphysical totality. The need for the completion of metaphysics is outlined here with the description of the end as “the gathering into the most extreme possibilities.”26 In addition to this, Heidegger continues his narration about the end in terms of “the thing itself,” to pragma auto. He uses this phrase of Plato to designate the problem of self-reference which hinders the radical opening by reducing the state of contingency. However, in What Is Called Thinking? we encounter a somewhat different stance on this problem. After citing the lines from Mnemosyne, Heidegger reflects on the mythical title of Hölderlin’s poem in order to introduce the problem of memory to the issue of thinking. He says:

Memory – from Latin memor, mindful – has in mind something that is in the mind, thought. But when it is the name of the Mother of the Muses, “Memory” does not mean just any thought of anything that can be thought. Memory is the gathering and convergence of thought upon what everywhere demands to be thought about first of all.27

This interpretation of thinking as thinking back, as the gathering of thought “in itself,” restores the dialectic between what Derrida calls “the thought of the hand” and “the hand of thought”. Taken as a recollection and gathering upon the thing being thought, memory transforms the work of the hand. It transforms since it arises outside of the hand which receives thought. Memory – the gathering per se, “in itself”, to pragma auto – means positioning. Memory “questions” Heidegger’s questioning as “the piety of thought”. If we follow the proposed explanation of why the hand becomes the sign,

26 Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” 57.
then the meaningless sign Heidegger designates as the condition of poesy still remains drawn by the event of withdrawal of thought. In this sense, what should be called event is not only the withdrawal of thought, but also the hand signing. To become the sign, the hand has to make a gesture, which is more than a simple movement. The gesture is never solely formal in its nature, since it emerges from the gathering of memory. In spite of the semantic void, the sign of the hand is a particular mnemonic gathering – and gathering would be nothing but coming to an end – occasioned by the event of withdrawal. What is gathered in the sign of the hand breaks the totality of alētheia, “the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the same”28. Here we encounter the other faculty of the hand, the one about which Heidegger keeps his silence when talking about technē – the monstrous one. This “monstrosity” could be traced back to Aristotle’s definition of technē, in which Heidegger dispenses with the possibility to think technē as a conceptual activity, as technadzein:

And every art is concerned with the process of coming-into-being, that is, with artfully contriving [to technadzein] and contemplating how something that admits of either existing or not existing may come into being, the origin of which lies in the person making but not in the thing made. For of the things that exist or come into being of necessity, there is no art, nor is there of those that do so according to nature, for these have their origin within themselves.29

This conception of technē goes beyond the dichotomy between the two aspects of the handwork. It relativizes the concepts of “presence-at-hand” [Vorhandensein] and “readiness-to-hand” [Zuhandensein] with the inversion of the act of bringing-forth. What is being inverted here is the approach to the issue of subject. The subjectivity of technē lies in the internalization which negates the primacy of the hand. This is why the question of what hand founds the other30 becomes irrelevant, since it essentially rests on Heideggerian objectivity in which there could be no possibility to think the other not as a gift, but an invention.

The Hand. Design

The whole problematic of Heidegger’s handwork seems to revolve around the issue of the other. Namely, his hand always encounters the other as a gift, it always receives the other. Even when it comes to the self, we do always experience it as something external, as a gift from the other. The other is never invented. But what remains unclear here is: what happens when we start thinking about all those gifts in the past

30 “What hand founds the other? The hand that is related to the thing as maneuverable tool or the hand as relation to the thing as subsisting and independent object?” Derrida, “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand,” 176.
tense. That is, what does the hand do with a gift after receiving it? Such a question would serve to introduce the issue of property, and consequently propriety, where if we follow the Latin root of these words\(^{31}\) we will return to the self. Nevertheless, the self, thought in this way, retains the polysemy of the word proper: at the same time being both distinct and suitable, the self remains connected with the other. This interplay we can find in Jean-Luc Nancy in his interpretation of Heidegger’s distinction between philosophy (or metaphysics) and thinking. He contemplates this distinction through the opposition of auto (the self) and allo (the other):

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[\ldots] \text{it is a contradiction inscribed in the heart of philosophy. Since it proceeds from the necessity of the auto – “to know, to be able, to want by oneself” – it can only simultaneously recognize and repel the allo in relation to which, however, the auto necessarily determines itself.}^{32}
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This act of referral seems fundamental for every discourse on the other. In Heidegger, however, the other “conceals” the problem of reference. The other is talked about without talking about the self. In this sense, alētheia carries the function of radical otherness, in which the self, the auto, is kept from being thought of as “in itself”, to pragma auto. The other thus transfigures into the whole of unconcealment. But the point where Heidegger cannot evade the problem of the self is the one when he introduces memory in his lecture on thinking. As already said, memory disrupts the totality of alētheia; and memory as a gathering constitutes the self. The problem of reference stays tacit here, but its culmination becomes evident with Heidegger’s distinction between the artistic and the natural poetic act, where the former one is defined as bringing-forth in another, en allōi, and the latter one in itself, en heautōi. In this way, the artist – the subject of creation, the auto – becomes the other, the allo.\(^{33}\) The self is then deprived of all its property, that is, its memory. Hence, in “losing oneself,” the self loses the possibility to act. And ultimately, with the disappearance of the subject, there is no act, but the event of bringing-forth.

The transition from the eventuality of unconcealment to the event of bringing into unconcealment could not be thought of if the hand were considered the other. Otherwise, alētheia would be reduced to the category of the temporal, from which danger arises in the form of destining, Geschick. The realm of destining is actually the realm of referral in which the hand, compelled to play with danger, restores the genuine other. What Heidegger calls the event of withdrawal could be considered an event

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\(^{31}\) Both these nouns have originated from the Latin proprius, meaning the exclusivity of one’s own, peculiarity which constitutes one’s character or individuality. See Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. by P. G. W. Glare, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), s.v. “proprius.”


only if in it something absolutely new comes about. Without the new, there would be no event of thought. This condition draws from the aforementioned constitution of the self in reference to the other. The issue of propriety deconstructs the other, which could be considered the other only insofar as it “brings” the new, or more precisely, it is the new coming about. The new is external to memory but its status, its quality of being new emerges from the mnemonic gathering upon that new. This is what mobilizes Heidegger’s hand: the entity beyond the recollection of memory, which, for the reason of not being involved, is of negative character. The new, therefore, constitutes the other as “not the self”. Such a setting would be similar to the concept of inadequate ideas in Spinoza. An inadequate idea is characterized by the same externality of the other. More specifically, its inadequacy originates from its cause being external to one’s mind. Spinoza defines inadequate ideas as false due to the privation of cognition which they involve. He adds, however, that falsity should not be equated with ignorance as absolute privation of cognition.\(^\text{34}\) In Deleuze’s view, this falsity results in the inability for an inadequate idea to be expressed. He emphasizes the term “involve” Spinoza uses to explain the ambiguous relation to the issue of truth that inadequate ideas comprise. For Deleuze, to involve a cause, “the objective essence of the external body”, does not mean to explain it:

[...]

our ideas of affections indicate a state of our body, but do not explain the nature or essence of the external body. This is to say, ideas we have are signs, indicative images impressed in us, rather than expressive ideas formed by us: perception or imagination, rather than comprehension.\(^\text{35}\)

This lack of explanation resembles Heideggerian meaningless sign, which too encompasses a sense of negation contained in the other. As Heidegger says, this is the state in which we do not yet think. In this sense, the interpretation of alêtheia as “not yet truth” leaves the possibility to approach the issue of contingency the same way as Spinoza does in his system of adequation. For him, contingency always belongs to the sphere of the singular, the extrinsic, in which the line between the true and the false dissolves. However, if one wants to enter the domain of poesy, of technē, the contingency of multiplicity, which would be the “gathering” of the singular, would have to be “gathered” in the new.

The new arises from the gathering of inadequate, or improper ideas – signs, provoked by the impropriety of the new, the otherness of the new, the state of the negated self. But to produce the new – to de-sign, to technadzein, the hand which encounters


the new has to finally ask: Spirit, are you there?\footnote{This is the title of the manifesto for the Domus magazine written by Jean Nouvel, who is the magazine's Guest Editor for 2022. “Spirit, are you there? Jean Nouvel's manifesto,” Domus, https://www.domusweb.it/en/speciali/guest-editor/jean-nouvel/2021/12/21/spirit-are-you-there.html, acc. on May 30, 2022.} Beyond Heideggerian Enframing, this question reverses into the \textit{prehensile} hand which poetically works by virtue of \textit{comprehension}.\footnote{For the definition of the figure of concept, see Snežana Vesnić, “Lik i figura koncepta,” in \textit{Arhitektonski koncept: Objekt stvarnosti i subjekt iluzije} (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga; Beograd: IDESE, 2020).} Thereby, the “event” of \textit{alētheia} (sign) grows into the “invention” of \textit{technē} (design). In Derridian terms, this would be the dialectic between the \textit{constative} and the \textit{performative}, which coalesce in the expression “the inventive event,”\footnote{Jacques Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” in \textit{Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1}, ed. by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 12.} where the hand simultaneously “designs and signs.” This problem of signature weakens the division between technology and its essence, the giving and the receiving hand, the self and the other, the first and the second “question concerning technology.” Between the instrumental and non-instrumental.

\section*{References}


