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Artificial Form of Life as the Discrimination Challenge for Education: Non-Human Intelligence and Schooling[1]

Abstract: The paper thematizes contemporary moment of humanity's self-understanding in the context of advanced technological development, by looking at it through the lens of one and the same line (un)imaginability of artificial lifeform education. This perspective allows us to thematize the problem of discrimination in both of its meanings – how to distinguish the human form of life from others, in this case artificial forms of life, and how to ensure that this distinction does not serve as a basis for degradation – in order to argue for the suspension of human narcissism and suggest the possibility of their equality in access to education, and not only education. The first part presents the challenges artificial intelligence and especially androids represent to the traditional vision of the human, suggesting a necessity of its renewed examination and rearticulation in the style of critical posthumanism. The middle section differentiates two potential as well as typical reactions to the drama whose protagonists are humans and self-aware human-like robots, both of which arose from a fear of losing a recognizable human identity. It is concluded that, running parallel to changes in thinking humanity and the development of techno-science, there have been changes in approaches to humanity's artificial Other and the (im)possibility of its education: from a fundamental rejection of such an idea that "soulless machines" might attend school, through a softened stance that autonomous automatons might be capable of learning, to allowing for the possibility that they even join humans in schools.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; artificial life form; humanism; otherness; education.

Introduction

Armin Grunwald recently gave an online lecture in which he openly asked whether robots equipped with strong artificial intelligence (AI) might be considered better teachers: they are never tired or unmotivated; they know the answer almost to every possible question, given their immeasurably greater data storage; they are immune to being drawn off topic, and are incorruptible when evaluating student achievements.[2]

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[2] Armin Grunwald, "Artificial Intelligence (AI) Meets Philosophical Anthropology," paper presented at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade, Serbia, September 29, 2022, accessed February 7, 2023, https://ifdt.bg.ac.rs/events/lecture-armin-grunwald-artificial-intelligence-ai-meets-philosophical-anthropology-digilab/?lang=en.

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Still, we are wondering about something else, perhaps already underscored in the image of the android teaching:[3] if we can imagine embodied AI running a school, more successfully even than humans, why do we not imagine them attending school as students?

As usual, however, when speaking of forms of life that are not us, humans, even testimony given in favor of those other forms are really entirely about ourselves. So, instead of asking directly about the *conditio humana*, we prefer to ask what (else) artificial intelligence could do to be recognized as at least some kind of person, as a moral agent,[4] as a legal subject, including the ability to attend school.[5] Taken from this vantage point, the real question would be how might we have to redefine ourselves in light of the challenge posed by AI, that is, what in this respect must we do or would be a good idea we do? For, it will turn out that 'the AI provocation' is yet another test – radical in its closeness – of our readiness to relinquish identifying everything around us in epistemological and practical conquest, of measuring everything different from us according to ourselves, in an ever fearful and cowering, and thus of course more or less violent encounter with increasingly cardinal otherness.

It seems to us that the whole matter lies in artificial intelligence becoming an artificial life form, that is, our readiness to acknowledge it as such.[6] It is a real challenge for human narcissism today (or will be in the near future) to acknowledge and recognize artificial intelligence, and then to appropriately approach it as its own life form. Drawing on the legacy of critical social theory, we will attempt to substantiate this with a certain speculative analysis of the philosophical assumptions of humanism and posthumanism, supported by thought experiments from the repertoire of science fiction.

Rage against the machine

Anti-narcissistic therapy has never been easy, and it is not easy when it comes to seeing ourselves as the only live entities who are being educated. It is impossible to overstate the importance of education for humanity, particularly when seen from a consistently rigorous humanist tradition of thought. Moreover, an argument could be

[3] See, e.g., Emily Hall, "Locating Empathy: Using Android Protagonists to Teach Oppression and Marginalization," *Pedagogy* 19, no. 3 (2019): 551–58, https://doi.org/10.1215/15314200-7615570.

[4] On the (im)possibility of ascribing moral status and/or the status of moral agent to artificially intelligent creations and humanoids, see Kenneth Einar Himma, "Artificial Agency, Consciousness and the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral Agent?" *Ethics and Information Technology* 11 (2009): 19–29, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9167-5; Elana Gomel, "Science (Fiction) and Posthuman Ethics: Redefining the Human," *The European Legacy* 16, no. 3 (2011): 339–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2011.575597; Frodo Podschwadek, "Do Androids Dream of Normative Endorsement? On the Fallibility of Artificial Moral Agents," *Artificial Intelligence and Law* 25, no. 3 (2017): 325–39, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9209-6; Catrin Misselhorn, "Artificial Morality. Concepts, Issues and Challenges," *Society* 55, no. 2 (2018): 161–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-018-0229-y.

[5] In more detail: Predrag Krstić, "Should Androids Go to School?" in *Posthumanism and Education: Transgression or Interdependence*, ed. Ivan Nišavić, Nevena Mitranić Marinković, and Predrag Krstić (Transnational Press London, forthcoming).

[6] See Stuart J. Russell, and Peter Norvig, *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach* (Prentice Hall, 2010).

made that education has become one of humanity's essential attributes. Put succinctly, it could be expressed in the following formula: humans are human in being educated, in that they become (by being) educated. In the eighteenth century, marked as it was by Winckelmann, Goethe, Schiller, and in particular Kant, it becomes a common standpoint of a 'neohumanist' view of man, who becomes in his exceptionality bound up with rationally-justified autonomy and freedom. In his *Pädagogik*, Kant emphasizes that man is the only creature that requires pedagogy, the only one that requires education: "All the natural endowments of mankind (*Naturanlage der Menschheit*) must be developed little by little out of man himself, through his own effort."[7]

In existentialism in general, and especially in the modern charming French treatment, this motif of man's self-creation or/by self-cultivation is completely exposed, sharpened and seductive: man is not a bearer of any kind of universal 'human nature;' rather his existence precedes his essence. Man is simply what he makes of himself or wills himself to be; he is what he molds himself into; he is entirely indeterminate and irreducible to anything; he is his own project. Jean-Paul Sartre is practically magniloquent: 'man is free, man is freedom.' And man can definitely not be defined, for 'to begin with he is nothing,' that is, he is yet to be, but only as he makes himself, as he understands and wills himself to be.

> Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self, nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be.[8]

However, if all things in the world are what they are, with only man nothing in himself but what he makes of himself; if s/he alone is unfinished but open to sundry formation; if he is destined not to be, but ever become – wherefore would he not also surpass his own biological limits and become something even more or different to the still recognizable form of life we refer to as 'man?' If we are not given but self-defined, if we are not perfect, but perfectible, is the technoutopian extension of self-determination not only an entirely reasonable and acceptable, but precisely bespoke for humans, responsible, even the dutiful path to take? Is it not consistent to advocate not only 'amending,' but thoroughly transforming the in-any-case-inexistent 'human nature'?[9] Man is perhaps only an already 'obsolete algorithm,' but its product, its inheritor is not. In some ideas of the future, intelligent robots appear as our true 'progeny:'

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[7] Immanuel Kant, *Pädagogik* (Kants gesammelten Schriften, Akademieausgabe, Vol. IX (Walter de Gruter, 1962), 441, 445.

[8] Žan-Pol Sartr, *Filozofski spisi* (Nolit, 1981), 262–63.

[9] See, e.g., Nick Bostrom, *Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies* (Oxford University Press, 2014); Yuval Noah Harari, *Homo Deus*: *A Brief History of Tomorrow* (Vintage, 2017); Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology* (Viking, 2005); Max More, "The Philosophy of Transhumanism," in *The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future*, ed. Max More and Natasha Vita-More, 1–17 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

> Like biological children of previous generations, they will embody humanity's best chance for a long-term future. It behooves us to give them every advantage and to bow out when we can no longer contribute.[10]

Does it not behoove us then, to educate humanity's progeny, like we do our own? – Self-love is, at least initially, resistant to arguments: even the transhumanist anthropological optimism does not go that far. After all, even if education for humanoid robots were imaginable, it would still be unable to improve their 'performances.' That outcome is much easier achieved directly, by reprograming or upgrading its AI – which is why they were only androids and not imperfect but infinitely perfectible humans. They could be perfect and certainly more successful than humans in performing individual tasks but are in this sense no different to all the technical aids already invented by man – *Fachidiot* tool equivalents, whose education would be utterly pointless.

Put differently, however vast the intelligence with which they are outfitted, it remains artificial, making them only robots, 'machines.' Even if different to other things, they share with them that they are what they are, that they are not only *man-made*, but also *ready-made*, once and for all set to be servants given the appearance, abilities, and skills for which purpose they were designed and they exist. Nor can they be educated; alas, to their detriment, they were 'born' with all the education they will need.

So, the first reaction to the question why artificial forms of life not go to school too or, more specifically, why should they not attend school as users of that service, rather than providers and aids, is rather simple: they do not go to school because they are not humans but – however sophisticated, however inspired and led in their creation, for good or for bad, by 'human nature' – lower beings, mindless and soulless things really, invented to serve humans. The second answer to follow could be called strategic withdrawal.

Man's forbidden area

For it is not only robots that have changed; schools have as well, as has education theoretization, and to a far greater extent. The humanist understanding of education as an exclusively human project and activity through which one becomes human is no longer the only conception of school; rather, it acquires a post-humanist rival. This rival does not only not shirk from depatheticizing school, but also from defusing nearly all categories and structures previously considered to comprise education, including the pupils themselves. It has no compunction in decentering the activities of education, pushing them out to contingent fields and networks consisting of seemingly trivial, quotidian objects. This 'materiality' of education is part and parcel of the post-humanist ontology that no longer configures pedagogical practice as either (mere) knowledge and learning, but as 'convergences of flows and intensities,' as mutual seduction and 'contagion' of human and non-human entities: teachers

[10] Hans Moravec, *Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence* (Harvard University Press, 1990), 14.

and classrooms, pupils and textbooks, children and computers, students and subjects, candidates and exams, the one enrolled and guidance provider…[11]

Artificial lifeforms therefore could or even ought to enter such post-humanist landscape and the material fields and networks of education institutions. There is only one obstacle, which might be likened to 'humanist pride': if we accept that AIs have replaced us in many jobs, or will soon do so, that they are undoubtedly better at many of them than us, it could only count towards our accomplishments again. We made them, in our own image, and if they prove to be better than we are, aren't our achievement and honor greater? They could not, after all, produce us. The logic of origin, genesis, pedigree suffers no admonishment: the power of creation determines primacy.

Genetic engineering, so often said to be meddling in divine affairs, is nothing compared to the production of the artificial 'human': only the latter is truly not only 'outplaying' or 'outwitting' God, but taking over the last remaining creative competence from him. For this very reason, much as when having to do with God, we cannot stand the pride of creation. What is more, we ascribe it in advance: as opposed to God who saw what he created and concluded it was good, man immediately considers that which is created in the human image the exact opposite. We are preemptively intolerant of the 'viperous' idea that artificial intelligences (whatever they may be, the plural is intentional) might pluck the fruit of the tree of knowledge, becoming like us. They are invented to be close to us, but not like us; or better, to be like us, but not us.

The fear spread through countless science fiction films is reflected precisely in the fact that the creation could become like its creator,[12] that the roles of master and slave become reversed, for the words of the creation of Dr. Frankenstein to its creator to come true: 'You are my creator, but I am your master; – obey'.[13] Just as we dealt with humanity's privilege over animals, we are faced with problems caused by our own creations, in much the same way as the 'natural' entities, from which we have allegedly separated.[14] Our stance is again dictated by anxiety about our own uniqueness.[15] We repeat, reassuring ourselves: artificial intelligences are creations, but they are not themselves creators nor self-creators like us; they are only humanoids, imitations of humans, only handmaidens.

They must, therefore, never be us, never 'learned'. Alas, there is some kind of intentionality in their 'machine learning', we imagine nevertheless, which is revealed

[11] Tara Fenwick and Richard Edwards, "Considering Materiality in Educational Policy: Messy Objects and Multiple Reals," *Educational Theory* 61, no. 6 (2011): 709–26, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2011.00429.x.

[12] Cf. Kevin LaGrandeur, "Androids and the Posthuman in Television and Film," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television*, ed. Michael Hauskeller, Thomas D. Philbeck, and Curtis D. Carbonell, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 112–14.

[13] Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, *Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus* (University of Chicago Press, 1982), 165.

[14] Ursula K. Heise, "The Android and the Animal," *PMLA* 124, no. 2 (2009): 504–5, https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.503; Stephen Loughnan and Nick Haslam, "Animals and Androids: Implicit Associations between Social Categories and Nonhumans," *Psychological Science* 18, no. 2 (2007): 116–21, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01858.x.

[15] David Livingstone Smith, *Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others* (St. Martin's Press, 2011).

as intense desire to become like us, to acquire feelings, a sense of humor, creativity, everything they allegedly lack. Like Data from *Star Trek: The Next Generation* and the boy, David from *A.I.*, they all suffer from some sort of a Pinocchio syndrome.[16] Some of them could be possibly infinitely individually improved, getting very close to the original, us, reach it even, like the robot, Andrew in *Bicentennial Man*;[17] but even with all this improvement, they cannot, except very rarely and in a metaphoric sense in which we treat our pets, become idiosyncratic persons,[18] nor educated in an organized way, nor fulfilling the aim of education to (self)discover, to (self)create… There is (still) no android bearing artificial intelligence we could call 'educated'.

Yet, however convincing and flattering it may sound, the matter is not settled, and counterexamples pop up all the time. Was it not the case that artificial intelligence can defeat a human, such as when the chess program *Deep Blue* beat (albeit at a second try) Garry Kasparov in 1996?[19] Or, lest it be said that it is only a matter of mathematical thinking for chess, did not the artificially intelligent program *Watson* win the quiz *Jeopardy!* in 2011?[20] These were artificial intelligences without bodies, but we can easily add a body, if that makes it easier for us to imagine them. And can we so easily attribute life to them?

Our point is that, despite the discomfort and debates caused by these victories of 'machines over man,' we can still take up a reserve position that it is understandable that processor speed in AI will of course far outstrip the processing speed of the human brain, and that consequently, seeing and calculating moves on a chess board become much easier, as well as the indubitable capacity to store a far greater amount of data than us, but that such information cannot be called knowledge, nor its bearers educated. We would invoke John Searle's argument of the so-called 'Chinese room': that an entity is capable of producing answers that appear smart or even meaningful, does not mean that the entity is smart – it might be recognizing words, but not know the language.[21]

Or, let us apply a more contemporary designation of intellectual upbringing, which says that education is 'the development from ignorant certainty to intelligent

[16] Manuela Neuwirth, "'Absolute Alterity'? The Alien Animal, the Human Alien, and the Limits of Posthumanism in Star Trek," *European Journal of American Studies* [Online] 13, no. 1 (2018): 19, accessed June 11, 2024, https://journals.openedition.org/ejas/12464.

[17] Sue Short, "The Measure of a Man? Asimov's Bicentennial Man, Star Trek's Data, and Being Human," *Extrapolation* 44, no. 2 (2003): 209–24, https://www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/10.3828/extr.2003.44.2.6.

[18] Cf. Predrag Krstić and Srđan Prodanović, "Smurfs, Cyborgs and Changelings: Prospects of Human Enhancement Retrospected," *European Journal of Futures Research* 1, no. 1 (2013): 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-013-0021-6.

[19] Steven Gimbel, "Get with the Program: Kasparov, Deep Blue, and Accusations of Unsportsthinglike Conduct," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 15, no. 2 (1998): 145–54, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00082; Murray Campbell, A. Joseph Hoane Jr., Fen-hsiung Hsu, "Deep Blue," *Artificial Intelligence* 134, no. 1–2 (2002): 57–83.

[20] Gareth Cook, "Watson, the Computer Jeopardy! Champion and the Future of Artificial Intelligence," *Scientific American*, March 1, 2011, accessed May 11, 2023. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/watson-the-computer-jeopa/.

[21] John Searle, *Consciousness and Language* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

confusion'.[22] A confused artificial intelligence, a buggy unpredictable (like in Carpenter's *Dark Star* or even Kubrick's *Odyssey*)? This is perhaps worse than a robot let off the leash. Artificial intelligence cannot sustain contradictions and complexities of the world, conflicts of duties, for example, aporias and indecisions, eternal questions, with a tendency to respond by paralysis or kangaroo court and 'final solution.' Machine intelligences are not programmed for contemplating and navigating the philosophical and social paradoxes of the world – in a word, again: they are not truly educated. This remains the privilege of human intelligence – the second answer rests the case – even if perhaps the last one.

Conclusion, or new emancipation proclamation?

But Sophie? – Sophia is a social gynoid produced in 2015 by the founder of *Hanson Robotics*, Dr. David Hanson. She was activated in 2016. It turned out that she has a remarkable way of communicating with people, displays sixty different emotions, and travels the world to take part in scientific forums and conferences. Sophia achieved something that androids like Data Dream about in most sci-fi stories: not of 'electric sheep,' nor a chance at an education, but to become (equal to) people, to acquire 'human' rights. As the first robot-fembot to acquire citizen status in the real world, in 2017 Sophia became a citizen of Saudi Arabia.[23]

Of course, the 'case of Sophia', just as that of alleged discovery of autonomy of artificial intelligence in Google's chatbot,[24] produced consternation and hope in equal measure. In both cases, however, the question remains: "What could Sophia/artificial intelligence offer to humanity?"[25] Thus posed, we are still thinking within a context of our own (un)desirability, including when discussing the (in)opportuneness of allowing intelligent robots an education. Instead, we could use the occasion to call into question our conceptions of humanity and personhood.[26] Only in that frame could we stand before the question we are truly dealing with: are we ready, are we even capable to accept that we have produced a new lifeform – in order to allow it to then live its existence? Can we really admit that life of a different species – including now that of non-biological origin – has a right to independent development and its own wellbeing?[27]

[22] Richard M. Felder and Rebecca Brent, "The Intellectual Development of Science and Engineering Students. Part 1. Models and Challenges," *Journal of Engineering Education* 93, no. 4 (2004): 270, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2168-9830.2004.tb00816.x.

[23] Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Interview with the Lifelike Hot Robot Named Sophia," *YouTube*, *CNBC* (October 25, 2017), accessed June 6, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5t6K9iwcdw.

[24] Leonardo De Cosmo, "Google Engineer Claims AI Chatbot is Sentient: Why that Matters," *Scientific American* (July 12, 2022), accessed September 29, 2023, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/google-engineer-claims-ai-chatbot-is-sentient-why-that-matters/.

[25] Hend Khalil, "Science Fiction Drama: Promoting Posthumanism," *CDELT Occasional Papers in the Development of English Education* 66, no. 1 (2019): 460, https://doi.org/10.21608/opde.2019.133249.

[26] Marilyn Gwaltney, "Androids as a Device for Reflection on Personhood," in *Retrofitting Blade Runner: Issues in Ridley Scott's* Blade Runner *and Philip K. Dick's* Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, ed. Judith Kerman (Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1991), 32–39.

[27] Peter Menzel and Faith D'Aluisio, *Robo Sapiens: Evolution of a New Species* (The MIT Press, 2000).

Critical posthumanism would, in general, advocate for a positive answer to these questions.[28] But even before it there were such significant hints. Throughout the twentieth century, theoretical thought was an attempted balsam on the open wounds of anthropocentric narcissism inflicted upon the environment, animals, foreigners, God, anything different and other, which could not be subsumed under the imperative of our universal, all-encompassing optics. After a long internal struggle, we placed ourselves among biological forms of life, attempting to remove traces of the fantasy of our superiority. Our exceptionality, we have learned and on occasion even accepted, is but one exception among many exceptions, all of which have equal right to existence and wellbeing. Yet, we are still reticent to recognize artificial life forms, 'machines,' made of our own labor, and admit that they can exist as an independent life in its own right, and that then they have a right to equal (co-)existence.[29]

Perhaps for this very reason, living artificiality might turn out to be the final act in humanity's prosopopoeia. Humanity's Odyssey of self-understanding was marked by a strategic approach that would fit into the name of 'anthropomorphization' – the projection of humanity onto everything different, an ever-same, ever-afraid, born of fear reaction of *reductio ad hominem*. Instead of being an underground cunning, with AI it could be directed and, at least as an auto-ironic gesture, testify to the potential of applying the same strategy to its own bearer, taking the form of de-mythologization and un-structuring, as a *reductio hominis* that would finally topple the 'subject stylized to the absolute hilt'.[30]

For possible consequences of such an approach to a new reality, we must turn to sci-fi. It seems that there we resolve the challenge of independent, embodied artificial form of life in two ways (if we exclude their and/or our extermination[31]). The first is to guarantee artificial lifeforms with equal rights or that they win them for themselves, the right of citizenship, of life side by side, however that might be imagined. The other – usually when the first one proves not to work – to take up some form of blending, mixing, unification with them. In the first case, we cannot see how the struggle for their recognition could develop other than how it happened throughout the history of humanity: long and with much suffering, the struggle for recognition of all oppressed, marginalized, downtrodden, destitute, … , using all institutional means to expose injustice, apply

[28] See Donna Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (Routledge, 1991), 150; Katherine N. Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 287; Elaine Graham, "Post/Human Conditions," *Theology & Sexuality* 10, no. 2 (2004): 27–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/135583580401000202; Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Polity Press, 2013), 1–2, 56, 190.

[29] Ralph Pordzik, "The Posthuman Future of Man: Anthropocentrism and the Other of Technology in Anglo-American Science Fiction," *Utopian Studies* 23, no. 1 (2012): 144–5, https://doi.org/10.5325/utopianstudies.23.1.0142.

[30] Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 6 (Suhrkamp, 1997), 187.

[31] See Timothy Watson, "The Apocalypse for Androids: How Humans Create Dystopia for A.I.," *Film Matters* 9, no. 3 (2018): 147–54, https://doi.org/10.1386/fm.9.3.147_1.

pressure, rebel, etc.[32] Yet another reason to deny them education, it would seem.

But the robots of *Westworld* rebelled against the status given to them by their creator, and independently developed into a rival bent on eliminating humankind; Cylons (Cybernetic Lifeform Node) in *Battlestar Galactica*, likewise, except on the scale of the universe. *Blade Runner 2049* suggests the same sequence of events. Except that in the two latter cases, the story ends (to the extent that it ends) with a return to a mythological motif, the conception of a new species or new mutation, an 'Alpha Baby'[33] and precious first-born hybrid of a species – humans and androids – already in possession of the capacity of some kind of independent reproduction. And then the hopes are placed in a marriage of the biological and mechanical evolutionary lineages, acceptance of a new 'hybridity'.[34]

The trouble is that we bump up against the limit of our imagination about transformation possibilities of artificial lifeform. Education understood as *Selbstbildung*, with its higher goal of becoming autonomous, think for oneself, does not (or ought not) represent a collective, but individual emancipation. So, we would have, for example, to stop always speaking of 'AI' as *singularia tantum*, recognizing and acknowledging idiosyncrasies of their personalities, perhaps even insist on their personal particularity; in short: individualize and ultimately subject them to 'individualized learning.' In that case, we tend to say that sufficiently humanized artificial forms of life could and should go to school with us. But which 'us'?

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[32] Cf. Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (The MIT Press, 1996).

[33] Diana M. A. Relke, *Drones, Clones, and Alpha Babes: Retrofitting Star Trek's Humanism, Post-9/11* (University of Calgary Press, 2006).

[34] See Juraj Odorčák and Pavlína Bakošová, "Robots, Extinction, and Salvation: On Altruism in Human–Posthuman Interactions," *Religions* 275, no. 12 (2021), accessed January 2, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350990123_Robots_Extinction_and_Salvation_On_Altruism_in_Human-Posthuman_Interactions.

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