As the ‘Intellectual Subject’ of Artificial Intelligence – The Intrinsic Understanding of Artificial Intelligence on The Ideas of ‘Time’ and ‘Space’

Shi  Tianyu

doi:10.25038/am.v0i20.328

Authors

Shi Tianyu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25038/am.v0i20.328

Keywords:

artificial intelligence, intellectual subject, time, space, objectification

Abstract

Presupposing artificial intelligence (AI) is an ‘intellectual subject’ rather than merely a product of complex operation is a prerequisite to discussing how AI and human intelligence inherently understand time and space. This article argues that AI as an intellectual subject and human intelligence have their respective origins and connotations, and different intelligent characteristics also lead to the difference between them in the way of inherently understanding time and space; different inherent understandings of time and space and whether to think with time and space as an ‘object’ are the underlying differences between AI and human intelligence. Meanwhile, so far AI is unable to process space-time issues by means of ‘non-objectification’.

Article received: April 26, 2019; Article accepted: July 6, 2019; Published online: October 15, 2019; Original scholarly paper

Author Biography

Shi Tianyu

Shi Tianyu
China University of Political Science and Law, College of Humanities, Beijing
China

Shi Tianyu, born in April 1992 in Liaoning Province, China, is currently a master's student at China University of Political Science and Law. He is mainly engaged in the research of Kant, Heidegger, artificial intelligence and modern philosophy, and strives to find a comparative perspective between Chinese and western philosophy and the development of communication. At the same time, he served as the coach of the school debate team in his spare time and won honorary titles such as the championship of China Open Debate Online. As well as being engaged in poetry creation, as of 2019, he has co-authored and published poetry anthology Pick Up Shadows and so on.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25038/am.v0i20.328 DOI: https://doi.org/10.25038/am.v0i20.328